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Abstract 
Rapid development in industry have contributed to more complex systems that are prone to failure. 
In applications where the presence of faults may lead to premature failure, fault detection and 
diagnostics tools are often implemented. The goal of this research is to improve the diagnostic 
ability of existing FDD methods. Kernel Principal Component Analysis has good fault detection 
capability, however it can only detect the fault and identify few variables that have contribution 
on occurrence of fault and thus not precise in diagnosing. Hence, KPCA was used to detect 
abnormal events and the most contributed variables were taken out for more analysis in diagnosis 
phase. The diagnosis phase was done in both qualitative and quantitative manner. In qualitative 
mode, a networked-base causality analysis method was developed to show the causal effect 
between the most contributing variables in occurrence of the fault. In order to have more 
quantitative diagnosis, a Bayesian network was constructed to analyze the problem in probabilistic 
perspective.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In chemical, petrochemical, food processing, papermaking, steel, power and other process 
industries, there has been a continuing demand for higher quality products, lower product rejection 
rates, and satisfying increasingly stringent safety and environmental regulation [1]. Modern control 
systems become extremely complex by integrating various functions and components for 
sophisticated performance requirement [2, 3]. With such complexities in hardware and software, 
it is natural that the system may become vulnerable to faults in practice and fault diagnostic tools 
are the main requirements to endure the process safety and quality of products. The objectives of 
these tools are earlier detection of problems to take actions that mitigates the fault’s impact on the 
system [3]. 
Over the years, many fault detection and diagnosis methods have been developed, each method 
manages to capture or model some subset of the features of the diagnostic reasoning and thus may 
be more suitable than other techniques for a particular class of problems [4].  As such, hybrid 
frameworks consisting of a collection of methods performing cooperative problem solving is 
proposed as an alternative to individual methods. Such a hybrid framework is an effective way of 
utilizing all available information and overcoming limitations of individual methods [5-7]. This 
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combination of different methods allows one to evaluate different kinds of knowledge in one single 
framework for better decision making [7].  
1.2. Objective 
The goal of this research is to develop a process fault detection and diagnosis tool that gives 
definitive answer about the root cause of a fault and helps operator to save the process. To this 
aim, KPCA, causality analysis, and Bayesian networked-base diagnosis methods have been used 
in a hybrid framework. However, there are some challenges based on previous research in this 
area. This research tries to propose a comprehensive methodology to address those challenges. The 
main objectives of this research are as follows:  
 We propose to improve the root cause diagnosis of KPCA through integration with 
knowledge based methods, i.e. Granger causality, transfer entropy, for better diagnosing of 
process fault's root cause.  
 Using a BN to integrate process knowledge of diagnostic information from various 
diagnostic tools (i.e. KPCA, sensor check module) to precisely diagnose the root cause of 
fault.  
 Develop systematic methodology to build BN (i.e. causality network, conditional 
probability) utilizing process data. 
The innovation behind this paper is how to combine the knowledge of individual methods in a 
hybrid framework. The main purpose is to develop a systematic hybrid tool for industrial fault 
detection, identification and diagnosis. The combination of some single methods has been less 
focused in the recent literature and is the novelty of this research. 
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1.3. Thesis structure 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: the second chapter will briefly describe fault 
detection and diagnosis methods and will highlight the most relevant sections related to the main 
objective of this thesis. In the third chapter, combination of KPCA and causality analysis was 
implemented to detect industrial faults and qualitatively diagnose the root cause. In the fourth 
chapter, a hybrid method combining KPCA and Bayesian network was implemented for fault 
detection and diagnosis, also some implementation issues of Bayesian network which received 
less research were addressed in this chapter. Finally, in chapter five research findings were 
summarized and some future research directions were discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1. Background 
Today’s plants in chemical and petrochemical industries are becoming larger, more complex, and 
operate with a large number of variables under closed-loop control. As industrial systems enlarge, 
the total amount of energy and material being handled increases. Corollaries of this trend imply 
that each hour of down-time is more expensive, and that the source of malfunction or fault is more 
difficult to locate. Fault is defined as “an unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic 
property of a variable from an acceptable behavior” according to Isermann [8]. Faults in a system 
may lead to degraded performance, malfunctions, or failures. The consequences of a failure are 
usually more serious, such as partial or complete system breakdown [9]. Therefore, early and 
correct fault detection and diagnosis is imperative both from the viewpoint of plant safety as well 
as reduced manufacturing cost. By process monitoring it is possible to reduce occurrence of 
sudden, disruptive, or dangerous outages, equipment damage, and personal accident, and to 
produce higher quality products [3]. 
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2.2. Fault detection and diagnosing the root cause of the fault 
Fault is malfunction of a system component and includes instrument malfunction (sensor or 
actuator) and abnormality due to variation in process internal variables. Instrument malfunction 
cannot be propagated through the process while variation in process internal states will be 
propagated through system and will affect the other states. The observable effect of a fault is 
symptom. Although the existence of noise is normal to a certain extent in a process, it always 
affects the symptoms and makes the task of process monitoring hard. The four procedures 
associated with process monitoring are: fault detection, fault identification, fault diagnosis and 
process recovery. Fault detection is determining whether a fault has occurred. Fault identification 
is identifying the observation variables most relevant to occurrence of the fault. Fault diagnosis is 
determining where fault occurred, in other words, determining the cause of the observed out-of-
control status [3]. 
Methods of FDD methods can be broadly classified into two major categories: model based 
methods, and process history based methods. Model based methods are divided to qualitative and 
quantitative sections [1, 4, 10]. Here we briefly explain these methods (Fig. 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. Fault diagnosis method (Venkatasubramanian, Rengaswamy et al. 2003) 
2.2.1. Model- based fault detection and diagnosis 
Model-based fault detection schemes are based essentially on analytical redundancy [11]. Sensor 
outputs are not independent from each other nor from the inputs to the system and given 
sufficiently accurate knowledge about a model representing the relationship between different 
variables in a process, the difference between the model outputs and the measurements are used to 
detect discrepancies. Clearly, model-based methods require an accurate analytical model of the 
system [10]. In general, a model based FDD system consists of two modules: residual generator 
and residual evaluator (Fig. 2.2). Residual generator compares the measurements of the system 
with the process model outputs and reports these differences as residuals. The residual evaluator 
receives the residuals and makes decision about faulty or normal state of the process [12]. Many 
model-based methods involve linearizing the model (if it is non-linear) about an operating 
condition in a narrow range and putting it into state space form (continuous or discrete), then 
calculating a residual vector from the measurements. The size of the residual can be compared to 
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a threshold to determine if a fault has occurred. Other properties of the residual vector are then 
evaluated to determine the type and magnitude. This can be accomplished by either designing the 
residual generation such that each element of the residual vector corresponds only to one particular 
fault, or by comparing the direction of the residual vector to the direction expected for each fault 
[13]. 
Residual 
generator
Residual 
evaluator
Fault detection 
and diagnosis
Process model
Process 
measurements
 
Figure 2.2. Model based fault detection strategy [13] 
In 1976, Willsky wrote the first major survey paper on model based FDD [14], especially on linear 
time invariant systems. This is followed by Isermann where he reviewed FDD design based on 
modeling and estimation method [13]. In 1988, the main properties of model based FDD was 
explained by Gertler where he presented the robustness and sensitivity considerations [15]. Frank 
developed an algorithm based on Artificial Intelligence-based FDD [16]. The offline and online 
algorithms in FDD was presented in a survey paper by Basseville [17].  
Model based methods can be divided into qualitative model based methods and quantitative model 
based methods. In quantitative models the relationships between the inputs and outputs are 
expressed by mathematical functions [10]. They compare the outputs of the real system with the 
expected value to detect and diagnose the faults. In quantitative model-based methods, the purpose 
is to detect a fault in the processes, actuator and sensors by comparing the difference between 
model and the process measurements that is called residual [8]. The main challenge in this method 
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is how to express the process in a model that accurately and comprehensively show the dependency 
between different parameters. In addition, chemical engineering processes are often nonlinear, 
which makes the design of fault diagnosis procedures more difficult. Furthermore, due to the on-
line requirements of the system, the implementation of the model-based fault diagnosis system 
strongly depends on the power of the computer system used. Thus, the rapid development of 
computer technology and control theory is a reason why the model-based fault diagnosis technique 
is becoming more accepted as a powerful tool to solve fault diagnosis problems in technical 
processes [20]. In qualitative models these relations are expressed by qualitative terms that are 
expressed either as qualitative casual models or as abstraction hierarchies for each unit in a process. 
In other words, it is in fact a knowledge base method that uses a set of if-then-else and inference 
engine to reach a conclusion [10] (more explanation is in section 2.2.3). Important reviews in the 
field of model-based methods include those by Chow and Willsky [21], Isermann [13], Basseville 
[17], Gertler and Singer [22], Frank [10], Isermann [11], Frank et al. [16], Isermann [8], 
Venkatasubramanian [10, 23]. 
2.2.2. Process history-based FDD 
Process history based methods are based on a large amount of historical process data and use a 
priori knowledge to extract features. Process data collected from the normal and abnormal 
operating conditions are used to develop measures for detecting and diagnosing faults. Since these 
methods are data-driven, the effectiveness of these methods is highly dependent on the quality and 
the quantity of the process data. Although modern control system allow acquiring huge amount of 
process data, only a small portion is usable as it is often not certain these data are  not corrupted 
and no unknown fault are occurring [4]. 
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According to the extraction process, the methods are divided into quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Methods that extract qualitative information include expert systems and qualitative trend 
analysis (QTA). Quantitative methods include neural networks and statistically derived models. 
Statistical models include those based on principal component analysis (PCA)/partial least squares 
(PLS) [23]. 
Both types of the model-based and history-based approaches have their advantages and 
deficiencies. According to the comprehensive review of Venkatasubramanian and Iserman model-
based FD can handle unexpected faults if complete knowledge of all inputs and outputs of the 
system including their dynamic relationships is available; however, in model-based FD such 
modeling information is not always available, and the modeling itself is not always accurate due 
to system complexities and nonlinearity. In contrast, data-driven FFD is easier to implement and 
thus widely selected for applications due to the lower requirement of a priori knowledge, while its 
performance yield to degradation by sensor failures and the limited coverage in the measurement 
space of the fault classifiers [4, 8]. 
In this thesis KPCA, which is nonlinear form of PCA, was used for detection of abnormality in a 
process. PCA is a multivariate analysis technique that extracts a new set of variables by projecting 
the original variables onto principal component space [24]. The extracted variables, called PCs, 
are linear combinations of the original variables in which the coefficients of the linear combination 
can be obtained from the eigenvectors of the covariance (or correlation) matrix of the original data. 
Geometrically, PCA rotates the axes of the original coordinate system to a new set of axes along 
the direction of maximum variability of the original data [25]. PCs are uncorrelated with each 
other, and the first few PCs can usually account for most of the information of the original data.  
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Determination of the appropriate number of PCs can be subjective. Several techniques exist for 
determination of the value of the reduction order like the percent variance test, the scree test, 
parallel analysis and the PRESS statistic [11, 26]. This method suffers from nonlinearity in the 
system data. 
In process monitoring with PCA models, it is assumed that a monitored process behaves linearly; 
however, when a process is nonlinear, a linear PCA model might not perform properly. Much 
research in this area has been performed to find a nonlinear version of PCA. Principal Curves [27], 
Kernel PCA [28], Mixture of Probabilistic PCA [29], Input Training Neural Networks [30] and 
Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model [31] are some of the suggested methods for implementing 
nonlinear PCA. Some of these methods which has been used in process monitoring is kernel 
principal component analysis (KPCA) which maps measurements via a mapping function from 
their original input space to a higher dimensional feature space where PCA is performed. The 
mapping function should be selected carefully, because its type determines the accuracy of the 
linearization [32]. 
An important property of the feature space is that the dot product of two vectors Фi and Фj can be 
calculated as a function of the corresponding vectors xi and xj, this is, 
ФiT Фj=k(xi, xj)     (2.1) 
The function k (·, ·) is called the kernel function, and there exist several types of these functions. 
Some popular kernel functions are polynomial functions; radial basis, or Gaussian, functions; and 
sigmoidal functions [28, 32]. More explanation on calculation detail on this section is provided in 
Appendix. 
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To illustrate how a nonlinear mapping to an expanded dimensional space can change a nonlinear 
distribution to a linear distribution, the following illustrative example is given: suppose we have a 
nonlinear process with two variables, x1 and x2, and there are two data sets; one set has normal 
measurements and the other one faulty measurements. Fig. 2.3 shows the plots of these data sets; 
the normal measurements are marked with blue asterisks and the faulty ones with green dots. In 
this case it is impossible to apply linear PCA to separate the normal data from the faulty one. 
However, as shown in Fig. 2.3, if we add a third dimension to the plot, calculated as x1
2+ x2
2, it is 
really easy to separate the normal and faulty measurements with linear PCA. Therefore, even 
though the original data is nonlinear in a bi-dimensional space, its mapping to a tridimensional 
space is linear. Principal Curves [27], Mixture of Probabilistic PCA [29], Input Training Neural 
Networks [30] and Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model [31] are some of the other suggested 
methods for implementing nonlinear PCA. Some of these methods such as Kernel PCA (KPCA) 
and Principal Curves have been used for process monitoring [24, 33]. 
 
   (a)       (b) 
Figure 2.3. Normal and faulty data (a) nonlinear (b) linear (after applying kernel) 
 
Although PCA and its derivatives are powerful tools among data-driven methods, they work 
appropriately in detection phase and isolate the variables that have high contribution in occurrence 
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of fault [4, 34].  The highly contributed variables based on contribution plots are those variables 
in the process that has high amount of variation due to occurrence of fault; however, the highest 
contributed variable in contribution plots is not always the true root cause of the fault which makes 
the task of fault diagnosis difficult. In diagnostic methods, there should be enough evidence on 
considering a suspected variable as the root cause of a fault.  However, in PCA there is not enough 
evidence to diagnose the highly contributed variable as the true root cause of a fault. For example 
sensor fault diagnosis problem using PCA is studied by Dunia[35]. They have proved that the 
method of PCA filtering satisfies detection but since it does not satisfy the identifiability condition, 
they used an optimization approach to reconstruct the faulty data. In this method, the notion of 
Sensor Validity Index (SVI) is introduced. SVI is a number between zero and one. When a given 
sensor is healthy SVI is close to one and vice versa. So the faulty sensor is diagnosed; however, 
the problem still exist and this method cannot always find the faulty sensor. The reason is that 
some sensors are much more sensitive than others in a sensor array and therefore have more 
influenced to this kind of filtering. So this method needs to be combined with another technique 
which can conduct the diagnosis phase[36]. 
2.2.3. Knowledge base methods in FDD 
2.2.3.1. Fault tree analysis 
A fault tree analysis or FTA converts the physical system into a structured logic diagram in which 
the event symbols and logic symbols are used. FTA includes the following four steps: system 
definition, fault-tree construction, qualitative evaluation, quantitative evaluation [37]. Hessian et 
al. used a FTA to diagnose faults for an existing control-room HVAC system. This logic-based 
methodology was incorporated into the operating system design to improve system reliability [38]. 
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2.2.3.2. Signed digraphs 
A signed digraph or SDG uses graphical models to capture the root cause. A SDG is usually built 
by nodes and directed arcs, in which the nodes indicate state variables, failure origins and alarm 
conditions, and directed arcs show the relationship between these nodes. Shiozaki and Miyasaka 
developed a HVAC fault diagnosis tool using SDG. A real-time fault diagnosis system could be 
created using this tool [39]. Maurya et al. presented SDG methods which were used for safety 
analysis and fault diagnosis in chemical process systems [40]. 
2.2.3.3. The possible cause and effect graph 
The possible cause-effect graph (PCEG) model consists of a representation of knowledge about a 
process and an inference strategy. The PCEG model is designed to take advantage of a large 
number of families of concepts. The model assumes that each family of concepts describes a 
partition of the plant time set and that one concept in each family represents the normal state of 
the process. [41].  
As mentioned earlier, any diagnosis model captures certain features of diagnosis reasoning better 
than other diagnosis models. Some of the reasons which indicate that PCEG may be the appropriate 
model to use rather than another models include the need to include general partition, a potential 
which exists for varying set of measurements, first principle knowledge which exists about the 
process, existence of coupling or recycling, possibility of explanation of all scenarios, complexity 
of a system.  
2.2.3.4. Bayesian network 
Bayesian network can effectively characterize the complex causal relationships among variables 
of  a system with stochastic uncertainty [42]. It visually represents a  probabilistic relationship 
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among some variables that are related to each other by arcs [43].  The problems that have been 
solved with a BN include diagnosis, automated vision, sensor fusion, manufacturing control, 
transportation, ecosystem, environmental management and forecasting [44-47]. Suitability for 
small and incomplete data, ability to combine different kind of knowledge and sources, and 
network learning capability are among the advantage of using a BN [47].  A BN has both 
qualitative and quantitative parts [48]. The qualitative part is a directed acyclic graph consisting 
of hidden (happenings) and observed nodes (measurements) with statistical dependencies 
represented by the arcs connecting the various nodes [9, 49]. The nodes with arcs directed into 
them are termed as child nodes, whereas the nodes from which the arcs depart are parent nodes. 
The quantitative part is a Conditional Probability Table represents quantitatively the cause and 
effect among variables. The nodes without any parents are called root nodes. BN is in fact a couple 
(P, G) where: 
P is a directed acyclic graph in which the nodes are random variables and some edges that 
represents conditional independent variables. 
G is a set of conditional probability distributions for each node (or each variable) either may be a 
table, for discrete random variables, or distribution, for continuous random variables, although in 
practice only discrete and Gaussian random variables can be treated due to mathematical 
complexity of the other type of continuous distributions [9, 50]. Such a network is called 
Conditional Gaussian Network. In order to facilitate the computation in a Conditional Gaussian 
Network a discrete variable is not allowed to have a Gaussian variable as its parents [51-53]. 
The issue of distinguishing between sensor and process fault has recently been the matter of debate. 
Krishnamoorthy et al. used Bayesian network to determine if the abnormal behavior is due to 
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malfunction in the sensor or due to a process fault. They used  the same network to both verifying 
the values of sensors and decision making [54]. Mehranbod et al. proposed a BN-based method 
for both single and multiple sensor fault detection and identification. They showed their method is 
capable of detection and identification of instrumental fault (bias, noise and drift) in both cases 
[55]. Dey et al. addressed the variation in tool wear, workpiece hardness and stock size in 
production machining environment and developed a methodology for diagnosing the root cause of 
process variation that are often confounded in process monitoring [56]. Yu et al. developed a 
modified Bayesian network-based two stage fault diagnosing methodology. They incorporated the 
result of Independent Component Analysis (ICA) and a Bayesian network for this aim [36]. More 
interesting was the work done by Yu et al. in which they used a dynamic Bayesian Network for all 
detection, identification and diagnosis phase. Abnormality likelihood index was introduced for 
detection of abnormal events. Bayesian contribution index was used for determination of 
contribution of each variable in abnormal event. The updating of network has lead to determination 
of fault propagation pathway in this work [57]. 
The network in a Bayesian network represents a causal relationship between different variables 
(nodes). Most research worked with Bayesian network for fault diagnosis construct the network 
based on process knowledge [36, 57]. However, one cannot be confident about constructed 
network based on knowledge of the process. More reliable network is the one that is constructed 
in corporation of both process knowledge and process data. Among the techniques that can be used 
for determining causality using process data are Granger causality and transfer entropy that will 
be explained more in the next chapters. 
Despite the abundance of research in the diagnosing a fault via BN, it is still unclear how to train 
the network and calculate conditional probabilities. Also, there is still ambiguity whether one 
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should use normal or faulty data for network training [36, 57]. Except faults, raw data of a process 
contain all noise and normal process variations which are considered as normal states of the 
process. So the methodology which is trained with raw data will be sensitive even to normal 
variation of the process.  There is less focus on whether we should use the raw data directly or we 
need some preprocessing on data before using them for training purpose. Also loop handling is a 
concern in applying Bayesian network for industrial process fault diagnosis. Since BN is an acyclic 
network, the updating of the network is not possible when it contains a cycle. However, in 
industrial processes there are many cycles such as close loop control system or reflux flow. This 
limits the application of BN in such a case.  
2.3. Combined framework of fault detection and diagnosis 
Currently there is no method that has all features of fault detection and diagnosis in a process. Each 
method has its own advantages and drawbacks [4]. Also some techniques perform appropriately 
in detection while others perform well in diagnosis phase [5, 6, 34]. To have a more complete 
technique by which both detection and diagnosis phase can be done, researchers have proposed 
hybrid framework in which a collection of methods are employed to construct a more robust 
package for fault detection and diagnosis. This package brings the advantages of the single 
methods and overcomes some of the shortcomings of individual methods. This combination of 
different methods allows one to evaluate different kinds of knowledge in one single framework for 
better decision making [7].  
A hybrid approach for fault detection in nonlinear systems was proposed by Alessandri [58]. They 
used some estimators, which provides estimation of parameters which describe instrumental faults, 
for fault detection and isolation. The estimators were designed using an optimal estimation 
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function which are approximated feedforward neural networks and the problem is reduced to find 
the optimal neural weights. The learning process of the neural filters is split into two phases: an 
off-line initialization phase using any possible "a priori" knowledge on the statistics of the random 
variables affecting the system states, and an on-line training phase for on-line optimization of 
neural weights. The approach proposed by Alessandri is only a fault detection and isolation 
method, leaving fault identification problem unsolved. A hybrid robust fault detection and 
isolation in a nonlinear dynamic systems was proposed by Xiaodong et al [59]. They utilized some 
adaptive estimators for this purpose. The fault detection and approximation estimator (FDAE) has 
been used to detect the fault, and the remaining estimators which are fault isolation estimators 
(FIEs) were used for isolation of faults. In other words, under normal operating conditions (without 
faults) FDAE is monitoring the system to distinguish whether the system is working under normal 
or faulty state. Once a fault is detected, the bank of FIEs is activated for isolation purpose. The 
nominal mathematical model of the system is explicitly used for designing both FDAE and FIEs. 
Recently, Talebi et al. proposed a hybrid intelligent fault detection and isolation methodology 
using a neural network- based observer. The advantage of their method is that it does not rely of 
the availability of full state measurements [60]. In order to make fault effect clearer and 
recognizable, Ren et al. proposed a combined method of wavelet transform and neural network. 
They used multi-scale wavelet transform to prolong the effect of fault in residuals before feeding 
them to neural network [61]. Mylaraswamy provided a brief comparison of the various diagnostic 
methods to highlight the inadequacy of individual methods and motivate the need for collective 
problem solving [6]. Mallick et al. proposed a hybrid method of PCA and Bayesian network to 
this purpose. They used PCA in diagnosis phase and probabilistic Bayesian network in diagnosis 
phase [34]. This framework for collective problem solving has been the focus of some researchers. 
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Chen et al. proposed a wavelet-sigmoid basis neural network for dynamic diagnosis of failure in 
hydrocracking process [5]. However there is still more need to research in this area especially since 
it is somehow unclear how to use the outcome of first section as an input to the other section. In 
other words it is worthwhile to know how to combine the knowledge of individual methods in a 
hybrid framework. 
As mentioned earlier, currently there is no single diagnostic method or technique which is superior 
to all other techniques. Each method manages to capture or model some subset of the features of 
the diagnostic reasoning and thus may be more suitable than other techniques for a particular class 
of problems [5]. In such a case hybrid frameworks consisting of a collection of methods performing 
cooperative problem solving is proposed as an alternative to individual methods. Such a hybrid 
framework will be an effective way of utilizing all available information and overcoming 
limitations of individual methods [4, 6, 7]. This combination of different methods allows one to 
evaluate different kinds of knowledge in one single framework for better decision making. This is 
the novelty and the main contribution of this thesis which will focus on how to use information of 
some diagnostic methods in other diagnostic methods. However, based on the reviews literature, 
there are some gaps in diagnostic task. Some of thesis gaps are related to the network constructed 
for failure diagnosis which have been explained in section 2.2.3.4. Another problem is how to 
distinguish sensor failure from the failures which is related to process internal states. All these 
concern will be addressed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
19 
 
Chapter 3 
Combination of KPCA and causality analysis for root cause diagnosis of industrial process 
fault 
Abstract: Kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) based monitoring has good fault detection 
capability for nonlinear process data, however it can only isolate variables that have contribution 
in occurrence of fault and thus not precise in diagnosing. Since there is a cause and effect 
relationship between different variables in a process, accordingly a network based causality 
analysis method was developed for different fault scenarios to show causal relationship between 
different variables and to see the causal effect between the most contributing variables in 
occurrence of fault. It was shown that KPCA in combination with causality analysis is a powerful 
tool for diagnosing the root cause of a fault in the process. In this paper the proposed methodology 
was applied to Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit and Tennessee Eastman process to diagnose root 
cause for different faulty scenarios. 
Keywords: kernel principal component analysis (KPCA), causality analysis, transfer entropy, 
fluid catalytic cracking. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Rapid development in industry have contributed to more complex systems that are prone to risk of 
failure, which are inevitable in any kind of industrial systems [23, 62]. In applications where the 
presence of faults may lead to premature failure, increased operating costs, or other undesirable 
consequences, fault detection and diagnostics (FDD) tools are often implemented [4]. The 
objectives of these tools are earlier detection of problems and expedited corrective action that 
minimize the fault’s impact on the system [3]. For the purpose of FDD, no single method has all 
the desirable features and each of them deals with some limitations [4]. In such a case, hybrid 
frameworks consisting of a collection of methods performing cooperative problem solving is 
proposed as an alternative to individual methods. Such hybrid framework is an effective way of 
utilizing all available information and overcoming limitations of individual methods. This 
combination of different methods allows one to evaluate different kinds of knowledge in one single 
framework for better decision making [7]. 
The work of Venkatasubramanian and Rich is among the earliest research in hybrid framework. 
In order to achieve an efficient diagnostic tool without scarifying the flexibility and reliability, 
they integrated the process knowledge with rule-based approach in an object-oriented two-tier 
methodology in which the process specific knowledge is in top-tier and the process rule-based 
knowledge is in bottom-tier. The proposed diagnostic tool was able to identify the potential 
suspects [63]. The analytical methods in model-based fault detection and diagnosis are based on 
residual generation using parameter estimation; however, the robustness of the model-based 
methods is often under question since obtaining an accurate model for process, especially for 
chemical processes, is problematic.  To address this problem, Frank proposed the use of analytical 
methods and integrated them with knowledge-based methods. They concluded knowledge-based 
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methods (expert systems) complement the analytical methods of fault diagnosis [16]. An 
integration of neural network and expert system for fault diagnosis was done by Becraft et al. Once 
the process fault was diagnosed by neural network, the results was analyzed by a deep knowledge 
expert system to recover the process [64]. The use of hybrid methods became common and in 1997 
Mylaraswamy provided a brief comparison of the various diagnostic methods to highlight the 
inadequacy of individual methods and underscore the need for collective problem solving. They 
proposed a Dkit based hybrid method of neural network for detection of a fault and a SDG for 
diagnostic action [6]. Zhao et al proposed a wavelet-sigmoid basis neural network for dynamic 
diagnosis of failure in hydrocracking process [5]. A hybrid methodology consisting of PCA and a 
Bayesian network was done in which PCA was conducted for earlier fault detection and Bayesian 
network was implemented for the isolation of the fault [34]. However there is still more need for 
research in this area especially since it is somewhat unclear how to use the outcome of some 
diagnostic tools as an input to the other tools. The innovation behind this paper is how to combine 
the knowledge of individual methods in a hybrid framework. The main purpose is to develop a 
systematic hybrid tool for industrial fault detection, identification and diagnosis. In the proposed 
methodology we combine kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) and PCA with two 
different causality analysis techniques namely, transfer entropy and Granger causality 
respectively. We also address how to use these causality analysis tools as qualitative techniques 
for root cause diagnosis of a fault in real practical processes which have not been focused in 
literature. In the next section we describe the methodology with instruction for coupling these 
techniques. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second part will briefly explain 
KPCA, transfer entropy and Granger causality and will provide a mathematical example to 
compare the results of transfer entropy and Granger causality. In the next section the application 
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of proposed method on FCC and Tennessee Eastman Chemical process is described. Finally, we 
conclude the paper with some concluding remarks and directions for future research. 
3.2. Methods and techniques 
As one of the most popular statistical methods, PCA extracts usable information from raw data 
[3]. Though originally developed to reduce the dimensionality of data, PCA is appropriate for fault 
detection. For diagnosing the main root cause, PCA is not an accurate tool but still the contribution 
plots based on PCA are worthwhile for identification of some of the variables that has the most 
effect on the occurrence of the fault [65]. However, PCA is not optimal when the data of a process 
does not follow a linear trend. KPCA is better suited to deal with process nonlinearity. On the other 
hand, causality analysis techniques between process variables have been the interest of research 
[66]. Among these techniques Granger causality and transfer entropy are prevalent methods to 
ascertain the causal relationship between process variables [67, 68]. The idea of causality analysis 
was first introduced by Granger in 1969. According to Granger, a variable 'X' Granger causes the 
other variable 'Y', if incorporating the past values of 'X' and 'Y' helps to better predict the future of 
'Y' than incorporating the past values of 'Y' alone [69]. The notion of Granger causality has been 
applied in the study of numerous economic relationships including that between money and prices, 
wages and prices, exchange rates and money supply, and money and income [70]. The transfer 
entropy provides a wide variety of approaches for measuring causal influence among multivariate 
time series [71]. Based on transition probabilities containing all information on causality between 
two variables, the transfer entropy approach was proposed to distinguish between driving and 
responding elements [72], and is suitable for both linear and nonlinear relationships; it has been 
successfully used in chemical processes [73] and neurosciences [74]. 
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Although PCA and KPCA are powerful tools for detection of a fault in a system, it cannot precisely 
identify the root cause. On the other hand transfer entropy or Granger causality can determine the 
cause and effect relationship between variables in a process; however, they suffer from the 
complexity of calculation when too many variables are involved in the calculations [71]. Also 
when there are too many variables, the constructed network based on causality analysis will be 
complex and busy and it does not give enough evidence to qualitatively identify the root cause of 
a fault (Fig. 3.1- a and b). The general considerations in application of PCA, KPCA, Granger 
causality and transfer entropy and their drawbacks are given in Table 3.1. Taking the 
considerations of each of these individual methods into account, this paper proposes a hybrid 
method of fault detection and diagnosis in industrial processes. Based on this table, a good 
combination between these methods will be done by combining PCA with Granger causality for 
detection and diagnosis of a fault in a linear system and also by combining KPCA with transfer 
entropy for detection and diagnosis of a fault in a nonlinear system. Since most of practical process 
data is nonlinear, it is better to combine KPCA for detection of a fault with transfer entropy as a 
causality tool for diagnosis. In this paper, additionally, even for nonlinear data we use Granger 
causality as one of the other tools for causality analysis for two reasons. First, based on some 
literature it has been theoretically proved that when data has normal distribution, Granger causality 
and transfer entropy has the same results [75, 76]; however, there is no practical case study to show 
this in a real system. Besides the main objective of this paper which is root cause diagnosis of 
process faults, one of the other interesting objectives is to show equivalency of Granger causality 
and transfer entropy in some real case studies. Secondly, the original Granger causality method 
which is proposed by Granger is linear. Linear Granger causality has low power to show the causal 
effect between variables in a nonlinear system. A nonlinear Granger causality developed by 
24 
 
Hiemstra and Jones [77] to examine the dynamic relation between variables of stock markets but 
their test was questioned by Diks and Panchenko [78]. As a result, the nonlinear application of 
Granger causality is still under question. So in this paper, we use both transfer entropy and Granger 
causality as two tools of causality analysis and will compare their performance on two case studies. 
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the procedure in which first KPCA was applied on the data gathered from the 
process. The KPCA detects the fault and identifies the variables which have the most contribution. 
In the diagnoses phase, causality analysis was performed among those most likely variables 
contributing toward the fault, and a simple network was constructed which provides a 
straightforward estimation of the root cause of the failure. Causality analysis can be done either by 
Grange causality and transfer entropy method. By combining KPCA and causality analysis the 
combined framework is a more complete package for FDD in comparison to each individual 
method. 
Table 3.1. General consideration of process monitoring tools 
 Linear/ nonlinear Calculation Detection/diagnosis 
PCA Linear Simple Detection 
KPCA Nonlinear Complex Detection 
Granger causality Linear Simple Diagnosis 
Transfer entropy Linear/nonlinear Complex Diagnosis 
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Figure 3.1. Causality network of (a) Fluid Catalytic Cracking process (b) Tennessee Eastman 
Chemical Process 
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Figure 3.2. Schematic illustration of the proposed FDD method 
 
3.2.1. Kernel Principal Component analysis (KPCA) 
PCA is a multivariate analysis technique that extracts a new set of variables by projecting the 
original variables into principal component space. The extracted variables, called PCs, are linear 
combinations of the original variables in which the coefficients of the linear combination can be 
obtained from the eigenvectors of the covariance (or correlation) matrix of the original data [79]. 
Geometrically, PCA rotates the axes of the original coordinate system to a new set of axes along 
the direction of maximum variability of the original data [25]. PCs are uncorrelated with each 
other, and the first few PCs can usually account for most of the information of the original data 
[3]. 
In process monitoring with PCA models, it is assumed that a monitored process behaves linearly. 
However, in most practical scenarios chemical processes are nonlinear, as such a linear PCA model 
is not optimal for fault detection. According to Cover’s theorem, the nonlinear data structure in 
the input space is more likely to be linear after high-dimensional nonlinear mapping (Fig. 3.3) 
[79]. KPCA exploits this property and projects data in higher dimensional space, subsequently PCA is 
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applied on the correlation matrix of the transformed variables. For example, a data set x is transformed into 
the feature space through mapping function Ф. The covariance of the mapped data is Ф(x).Ф(x).  
Ф is the mapping function which is usually not easy to determine [80]. Since only the dot product is required 
in the transformed space, an alternative is to use a kernel function k (·, ·) which can provide the dot product 
without the explicit mapping function as in Equation 3.1. 
𝑘(𝑥, 𝑥) = Ф(𝑥).Ф(𝑥)       (3.1) 
There exists several types of these functions. Some popular kernel functions are polynomial functions; 
radial basis, or Gaussian functions; and sigmoidal functions  [28, 32].  
 
Figure 3.3. Linearization with mapping function in KPCA 
3.2.2. Causality analysis based on Granger Causality 
Granger causality uses parameters from an (Auto Regressive) AR model fit to the system in 
question. A general form of the AR model which is used in system model prediction is shown in 
the following equation: 
𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡
r
i=1        ( .3 2) 
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Where x is a vector consisting r time series data points; α is a 𝑟 × 𝑟 coefficient matrix and e is the 
uncorrelated noise vector. The concept of the history-based causality introduced by Wiener and 
formulated by Granger has played a significant role in investigating the relations among the 
stationary time series [69, 81]. The original definition by Granger, which is called Granger 
Causality, refers to the improvement in predictability of a time series x that derives from the 
incorporation of the past of x itself and another series y, above the predictability based solely on 
the past of the x series [69]. Considering two time series x and y, there are two different linear 
regression model. One is a restricted model in which the prediction of x at time k is possible using 
the information of the past of x: 
𝑥𝑘 = ∑ µ𝑖𝑥𝑘−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑥𝑘
𝑝
𝑖=1       (3.3) 
where xk is the x time series at time k; xk-i is the i-lagged x time series; µ is the regressive 
coefficients; p is the amount of lag considered; and ε denotes the residual series for constructing 
xk.  
The second model is unrestricted model in which the prediction of x at time k is done using the 
past information of both x and y as follows: 
𝑥𝑘 = ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑘−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑘−𝑗 + 𝜂𝑥𝑘
𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑝
𝑖=1     (3.4) 
where xk is the x time series at time k; xk-i and yk-j are respectively the i-lagged x time series and j-
lagged y time series; γ and β are the regressive coefficients; p and q are the amount of lag 
considered or model order; and η denotes the unrestricted model residual at time k. The µ, β, and 
γ parameters are calculated using least square method. In order to estimate the model, a small value 
of model order p results a poor estimation while a large value leads to problem of overfitting. Two 
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criteria are used to determine the model order namely, Akaike information criterion (AIC) [82] and 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [83]. For n variables, AIC and BIC are given as follows: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = ln(|𝛴|) + 
2𝑝𝑛2
𝑇
      (3.5) 
𝐵𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = ln(|𝛴|) + 
ln(𝑇)𝑝𝑛2
𝑇
      (3.6) 
where Σ represents the noise covariance matrix and T is the total number of observations. When 
the variability of the residual of the unrestricted model is significantly reduced with that of a 
restricted model, then there is an improvement in the prediction of x due to y. In other words y is 
said to Granger cause x. This improvement can be measured by the F statistic: 
𝐹 = 
(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑟−𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑟) 𝑞⁄
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑟 (𝑇−𝑝−𝑞−1)⁄
~ 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑇 − 𝑝 − 𝑞 − 1)    (3.7) 
where RSSr is the sum of the squares of the restricted model residual, RSSur is the sum of the 
squares of unrestricted model residual, and T is the total number of observations used to estimate 
the model. F statistics approximately follows F distribution with degrees of freedom p and (T-p-
q-1). If the F statistic from y to x is significant, then the unrestricted model yields a better 
explanation of x than does the restricted model, and y is said to Granger cause x [84]. 
3.2.3. Causality analysis based on Transfer entropy 
For two process variables with sampling interval of τ , xi= [xi,  xi-τ, … ; xi-(k-1) τ] and yi=[yi, yi- τ,  … 
, yi-(l-1) τ],  transfer entropy from y to x is defined as follows [71]: 
𝑡(𝑥│𝑦) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖+ℎ, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖)  . 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑃(𝑥𝑖+ℎ│ 𝑥𝑖 ,𝑦𝑖)
𝑃(𝑥𝑖+ℎ│𝑥𝑖)
𝑥𝑖+ℎ,𝑥𝑖,𝑦𝑖   (3.8) 
where P denotes the probability density function (PDF) and h is the prediction horizon. 
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Transfer entropy represents the measure of information transfer from y to x by measuring the 
reduction of uncertainty while assuming predictability [71]. It is defined as the difference between 
the information about a future observation of x obtained from the simultaneous observation of past 
values of both x and y, and the information about the future of x using only past values of x. The 
parameter values specially k, l, τ and h should be obtained based on several results and their 
comparison [68]. 
Using the above definitions, direction and amount of information transfer from x to y is as follows: 
𝑡(𝑥 → 𝑦) = 𝑡(𝑦│𝑥) − 𝑡(𝑥|𝑦)     (3.9) 
If t(x→y) is negative then information is transferred from y to x. Since at first there is no knowledge 
about which node is cause and which one is effect, choosing these nodes inversely will result in 
negative value. 
The advantage of using transfer entropy is that it is a model free method and can be applied to non-
linear data. It has already been proved to be very effective in capturing process topology and 
process connectivity. But it suffers from a large computational burden due to the calculation of the 
PDFs [71]. Non parametric methods, e.g. kernel method, can be used to estimate the PDF [85]. 
The Gaussian kernel function is used to estimate the PDF which is defined as follows [68]: 
𝐾(𝑣) =
1
√2𝜋
𝑒−
1
2
𝑣2
       (3.10) 
Therefore, a univariate PDF can be estimated by, 
𝑝(𝑥) =
1
𝑁.𝑑
∑ 𝐾(
𝑥−𝑥𝑖
𝑑
)𝑁𝑖=1       (3.11) 
where N is the number of samples, d is the bandwidth chosen to minimize the error of estimated 
PDF. d is calculated by d = c.σ.N0.2 where σ is variance and c = (4/3)0.2≈1.06 according to the 
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“normal reference rule-of-thumb” approach. For a q-dimensional multivariate case the estimated 
PDF is given by [68]: 
𝑃(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑞) =
1
𝑁.𝑑1…𝑑𝑞
∑ 𝐾 (
𝑥1−𝑥𝑖1
𝑑1
) . 𝐾(
𝑥𝑞−𝑥𝑖𝑞
𝑑𝑞
)𝑁𝑖=1   (3.12) 
where 𝑑𝑠 = 𝑐. σ(𝑥𝑖,𝑠)𝑖=1
𝑁
. 𝑁
−1
(4+𝑞)⁄ for 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑞. 
3.2.4. Mathematical example on causality analysis 
A simple mathematical model is used to investigate the applicability of mentioned causality 
analysis, i.e. Granger causality and transfer entropy. Assume four correlated continuous random 
variables x, y, z and w satisfying: 
yk+1=0.8 xk +v1k 
zk+1 =0.6 yk+v2k   (3.13) 
wk+1= 0.6yk + v3k 
where x ~ N(0,1); v1, v2 and v3 ~ N(0,0.1); and y(0)=2.8. The simulation data set consists of 1000 
samples. Based on the mathematical relation between variables the causal network is shown in 
Fig. 3.4 and this network will be validated by the above mentioned methods.  
3.2.4.1. Validation by Granger causality 
In order to test Granger causality between variables, the time series should be stationary, i.e. 
statistical properties such as mean, variance, and autocorrelation all are constant over time. Eviews 
was used to see the cause and effect relationship between x, y, z and w. Eviews is a statistical 
software used to analyze time-series oriented problems. The results are shown in Table 3.2. When 
prob<0.05 the corresponding variable in that row has influence on the variable in the column. For 
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example probx→y=0.0000. It means that x has influence on y, consequently, there is an arc from x 
to y. Also proby→z=0.0000 and proby→w=0.0000 indicating arcs from y to z and y to w in the 
network. 
3.2.4.2. Validation by transfer entropy 
Transfer entropy was used to calculate mutual transfer entropy between all nodes. A Matlab code 
was developed for calculations. While calculating the TEi→j, multiple j-delays were given and the 
peak value of transfer entropy was considered over the delay (Table 3.3).  The TEx→y= 0.25 
indicating that x has influence on y. Also TEy→z= 0.56 and TEy→w= 0.54 indicating the arcs from 
y to z and y to w (Fig. 3.4).The calculation of probabilities in Equation 10 was done using histogram 
and it deals with some inaccuracy. Here a threshold of 0.1 was selected, thus the causal 
relationships between other variables were neglected and, consequently, the original network of 
the mathematical example will be verified in Fig. 3.4. 
Thus it is obvious, when variables are following a normal distribution, the Granger causality and 
transfer entropy are showing the same causal relationship in network construction. This has been 
verified by other researchers as well [75, 76]. 
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Table 3.2. Granger causality test results for mathematical model 
 x y z w  
x - 
- 
59226.84 
0.0000 
6.1749 
0.0956 
1.6337 
0.0741 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
y 1.3044 
0.5209 
- 
- 
479.75 
0.0000 
439.20 
0.0000 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
z 1.4758 
0.4761 
0.6921 
0.7074 
- 
- 
0.0686 
0.9663 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
w 0.8374 
0.6579 
1.0960 
0.5761 
5.7775 
0.0556 
- 
- 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
 
Table 3.3. Mutual transfer entropy values for mathematical model 
 x y z w 
x - 0.25 
<0.1 <0.1 
y - - 0.56 0.54 
z - - - 
<0.1 
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Figure 3. 4. The network of mathematical example 
 
3.3. Industrial case studies 
3.3.1. Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCC) 
A FCC unit converts a number of heavy hydrocarbons with different molecular weights to lighter 
and more valuable hydrocarbons. The heavy hydrocarbons come from different parts of refinery 
and are diverse in chemical properties. FCC process was selected as one of the examples for this 
research. A schematic illustration of the FCC reactor/regenerator unit is shown in Fig. 3.5. There 
are three inputs to the system: fresh feed temperature, feed coke factor and ambient temperature. 
Also 20 variables are monitored during the process that all are shown in Table 3.4. Feed coke 
factor was considered to be 1.05 in all simulation studies. Therefore, two disturbances were 
introduced as faults to the system according to Table 3.5 [86]. 
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Figure 3.5. Schematic illustration of FCC process 
 
 
Table 3.4. Measured variable of FCC process 
No. Variables symbol 
1 Ambient air temperature Tamb 
2 Fresh feed temperature T1 
3 Effective coking factor Psi 
4 Reactor pressure P4 
5 Differential pressure ΔPRR 
6 Air flow rate into generator Fair 
7 Regenerator pressure P6 
36 
 
8 Furnace temperature T3 
9 Preheated feed temperature T2 
10 Riser temperature Tr 
11 Regenerator temperature Treg 
12 Spent catalyst level Lsp 
13 Cyclone temperature Tcyc 
14 Differential cyclone temperature DP 
15 Stack gas CO concentration Xco 
16 Stack gas O2 concentration XO2 
17 Coke wt fraction in spent catalyst Csp 
18 Coke wt fraction in regenerator Crgc 
19 Air blower flow inlet-surge F8 
20 Wet compressor inlet suction flow Fsucn,wg 
21 Combustion air suction flow Fsucn,comb 
22 Combustion air suction pressure P1 
23 Combustion air discharge pressure P2 
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Table 3.5. Fault scenarios in FCC 
Scenario No. Fault description 
1 5°C in atmosphere temperature 
2 Gradual increase of 10°C in fresh feed temperature  
 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed hybrid technique of KPCA and causality 
analysis, KPCA was used to detect the occurrence of fault. A training data set consisting of 1000 
samples gathered under normal operating condition is used to develop KPCA model and estimate 
the Hotelling T2. In order to build the KPCA model, the values of the 23 variables in the FCC 
process were normalized around the Zero by standard deviation. The sampling time of the data is 
1 second and a Gaussian kernel function was selected. Five principal components were selected 
that show 85% of the variations in the system. Only the eigenvectors and eigenvalues 
corresponding to selected PCs were considered. The threshold value based on normalized training 
data for Hotelling T2 was calculated as 9.71 at 95% confidence level.  
First abnormal event: The first faulty scenario begins with normal operation for 1000 seconds 
and then is followed by a 5°C increase in ambient air temperature for the remaining 4000 seconds.  
The Hotelling T2 and contribution plots of the KPCA analysis are shown in the Fig. 3.6. On Fig. 
3.6a, the Hotelling T2 shows the departure of variables from normal condition. This plot depicts a 
successful detection of this fault. As can be seen, there is a delay associated with the detection 
phase. It is because the magnitude of fault in ambient air temperature is not big enough to affect 
the process in a short time. Once these faults are detected, it is desired to isolate the occurred fault, 
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i.e. to identify those variables that are most correlated with occurred faults. Fig. 3.6b shows 
contributions of each variable in the fault occurrence. The calculation of contribution of each 
variables is calculated based on the method proposed by Alcala and Qin [87, 88]. The contribution 
plots are based on average of contribution of all samples when the process is in abnormal state.  It 
is obvious in this figure when there is a disturbance in ambient temperature, the other variables 
will be affected by this variation; however some variables will be affected more than others. It 
should be noted that the air enters to the regenerator through two air blower. One is a lift air blower 
that assists in catalyst circulation from the reactor to the regenerator. The other is a combustion air 
blower that provides the bulk of air required by the regenerator. So one expect that a variation in 
the ambient air temperature will mostly deviate the process in the regenerator side. This can be 
verified by the contribution plot since based on this plot, the following variables have significant 
contribution to the fault which all are in regenerator side: 
 Ambient air temperature 
 Regenerator pressure 
 Combustion air suction flow 
 Combustion air discharge pressure 
As the FCC process has 23 variables, it is difficult to decide about the root cause of a fault via the 
whole network containing all 23 nodes. The calculation of Granger causality and transfer entropy 
will be more complex when there are more variables. Even after doing such calculations, the 
constructed network was found too busy for visual illustration of the propagation path of the fault 
and diagnosing the root cause. The full network of FCC process is shown in Fig. 3.1a. It is obvious 
that the network is complicated and it is difficult to have an accurate estimation of the root cause 
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of the fault using this network.  Hence, KPCA was used to narrow down the problem and to screen 
the most significant variables for further analysis. In fault diagnosis phase, the purpose is to 
investigate the cause and effect relationship between the variables selected by contribution plot. 
Table 3.6a shows the results of Granger causality test for this scenario for the selected variables 
via KPCA. Where the prob<0.05, it rejects the null hypothesis and indicated that the variable in 
the row has influence on the variable in column. For example, based on the first column of Table 
3.6a no variable has effect on ambient air temperature.  In the second column, ambient air 
temperature has influence on regenerator pressure. Also in the third column of this table, ambient 
air temperature and combustion air suction flow have influence on combustion air discharge 
pressure and based on the forth column ambient air temperature has influence on combustion air 
suction flow. These results are in accordance with the results of transfer entropy test. The mutual 
transfer entropy values were calculated among the most important variables as determined by 
KPCA contribution plots and the results are shown in Table 3.7a. In this table, when the value of 
transfer entropy is positive, the variable in row has influence on the variable in column and when 
the value of transfer entropy is negative, the variable in column has effect on the variable in the 
row. For example according to Table 3.7a ambient air temperature has effect on regenerator 
pressure (TE Tatm → P6= 0.13 ). This is because variation in air temperature will affect the air density 
which is flowing to compressor and this compressor is adjusting the pressure inside the regenerator 
(P6). On the other hand, combustion air suction flow has effect on combustion air discharge 
pressure (TE Fsucn,comb → P2= -0.25) that is clearly interpretable based on process flow diagram. 
Among all 23 variables on FCC, the contribution plots of KPCA guide our focus more on the 
variables on a particular part of the process or among more important variables related to the fault, 
and causality analysis show the causal relationship between the variables in that particular part. 
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For example, in this faulty scenario the contribution plots bring our attention to regenerator side 
and highlights four suspected variables in that area. The causality analysis sketches the causality 
between those suspected variables to find the root cause. The values of transfer entropy approve 
the network that has been developed by Granger causality (Fig. 3.7a). Based on this network 
ambient air temperature affects the other three variables while it is not affected by other variables 
that indicates that ambient temperature is the root cause for this abnormal event.  Although the 
highest contribution from KPCA was for combustion air discharge pressure, but the simplified 
causality network shows that among these variables ambient temperature has the ability to effect 
the other variables. This simplified causality network is also consistent with the original network 
developed based on all 23 variables. However, it is simpler and clearer in describing the causality 
between variables. 
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Figure 3.6. KPCA results for FCC (a) T2 Hotelling. Contribution plots for (b) fault in ambient 
temperature (c) fault in fresh feed temperature 
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Second abnormal event: The second faulty scenario begins with normal operation for 1000 
seconds and then is followed by a 10°C increase in fresh feed temperature for the remaining 4000 
seconds. 
In detection phase of the proposed method, the KPCA model construction is the same as first faulty 
case. The Hotelling T2 and contribution plots of the KPCA analysis are shown on the Fig. 3.6. On 
Fig. 3.6a, the Hotelling T2 values exceed the threshold after fault initiated indicating a successful 
detection of the mentioned fault. As can be seen in Fig. 3.6a, there is a small delay associated with 
the detection phase; however the lag time is smaller than that of the first abnormal event. The 
reason is that increase in fresh feed temperature entering to the process will affect the process 
earlier than the case there is an increase in air temperature because more enthalpy will be entered 
to the process when the feed temperature increases rather than increase in air temperature. Fig. 
3.6c shows contributions to occurrence of the fault. Based on this figure, the following variables 
have significant contribution to process deviation from steady state when there is a variation on 
fresh feed temperature: 
 Fresh feed temperature  
 Furnace temperature  
 Preheated feed temperature 
 Regenerator pressure 
 Differential pressure. 
Selection of these variables from contribution plots bring the attention mainly to the furnace, the 
bottom of the reactor, and the pressure in the system. In the fault diagnosis phase, the causality 
analysis will show the causal effect among variables in the suspected area selected by KPCA 
analysis. Table 3.6b, shows the results of Granger analysis on this abnormal event. The first row 
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of this table shows that fresh feed temperature has effect on furnace temperature and preheated 
feed temperature which in entering to riser. Also furnace temperature has influence on preheated 
feed temperature. In the third row, a variation on temperature of the feed entering to the reactor 
riser will affect both the differential pressure and the regenerator pressure. The fourth row indicates 
that regenerator pressure also has influence on differential pressure between reactor and 
regenerator. The mutual transfer entropy values for this abnormal condition are given in Table 
3.7b. These results are in accordance with the results of Granger causality which all verify the 
causal effect elicited from process knowledge (Fig. 3.7b). Based on process knowledge, heat 
balance around furnace in steady state shows that the enthalpy of the preheated fresh feed 
temperature is equal to the enthalpy of fresh feed entering to the furnace plus the net amount of 
enthalpy given to the fresh feed by the furnace. At constant pressure in the furnace, the enthalpy 
is a function of temperature and consequently the preheated feed temperature (T2) is affected by 
fresh feed entering to the furnace (T1) and furnace temperature (T3). Also any variation in solid 
material temperature entering to the reactor will increase the enthalpy content in the reactor and 
this will affect the pressure of the unit.  Fig. 3.7b shows the constructed network based on both 
methods of causality analysis. Based on this network, fresh feed temperature has influence on the 
other variables, either directly or indirectly, while it cannot be affected by other variables 
indicating that this variable is qualitatively suspected to be the root cause of the abnormal variation 
in the process. 
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Table 3.6. Granger test results of variables in FCC unit. (a) Fault in ambient air temperature, (b) 
fault in fresh feed temperature 
 Tamb P6 P2 Fsucn,comb  
Tamb - 
- 
66.65 
0.0000 
3229.33 
0.0000 
4554.66 
0.0000 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
P6 0.8719 
0.6466 
- 
- 
0.4768 
0.7879 
1.09 
0.5789 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
P2 0.8940 
0.6395 
0.3213 
0.8516 
- 
- 
73.76 
0.4053 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
Fsucn,comb 0.1874 
0.9105 
0.0941 
0.9540 
261.64 
0.0000 
- 
- 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
(a) 
 T1 T3 T2 P6 ΔPRR  
T1 - 
- 
3536.90 
0.0081 
62441.16 
0.0000 
8733.5 
0.0843 
12344.3 
0.0763 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
T3 4.8931 
0.0866 
- 
- 
399.07 
0.0000 
7844.4 
0.1023 
14938.3 
0.06943 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
T2 3.9197 
0.1409 
2.1850 
0.3354 
- 
- 
89453 
0.0000 
45433.4 
0.0343 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
P6 1232.554 
0.76534 
45.544 
0.75564 
564.433 
0.8874 
- 
- 
97546.6 
0.0000 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
ΔPRR 34.543 
0.98576 
7544.64 
0.4643 
9844.4 
0.3453 
3754.66 
0.64665 
- 
- 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
(b) 
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Table 3. 7. Transfer entropy between the most effective variables in two fault scenarios (a) fault 
in ambient temperature (b) fault in fresh feed temperature 
 
 Tamb P6 P2 Fsucn,comb 
Tamb - 0.13 0.27 0.23 
P6 - - <0.1 <0.1 
P2 - - - -0.25 
(a) 
 T1 T3 T2 
P6 ΔPRR 
T1 - 0.24 0.38 <0.1 <0.1 
T3 - - 0.42 <0.1 <0.1 
T2 - - - 0.34 0.65 
P6 
- - - - 0.16 
(b) 
Tamb
P2
P6
Fsucn,comb
T1
T3
T2
(a) (b)
P6
ΔPRR
 
Figure 3.7.  Causal network of two faulty scenario in FCC (a) fault on ambient temperature (b) 
fault on fresh feed temperature 
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3.3.2. Tennessee Eastman Chemical Process 
In order to further demonstrate the performance of the proposed method, it was applied to diagnose 
some faults in Tennessee Eastman Chemical process. This process consists of five major units: a 
reactor, condenser, compressor, separator, and a stripper; and, it contains eight components: A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G, and H. The process flow diagram of this process is shown in Fig. 3.8. It consists of 
41 measured variables and 12 manipulated variables. Among measured variables, 22 variables are 
continuous process variables and 19 variables are related to composition measurements.  The 22 
continuous process variables are shown in Table 3.8 that are the main focus of this research.  There 
are 21 faults in this process but among them we concentrate our study on those that are mentioned 
in Table 3.9 [3]. 
 
Figure 3.8. Schematic of Tennessee Eastman process 
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Table 3.8. Measured variables in TE 
Variable Description 
XMEAS(1) A feed (stream 1) 
XMEAS(2) D feed (Stream2) 
XMEAS(3) E feed (Stream 3) 
XMEAS(4) Total feed (Stream 4) 
XMEAS(5) Recycle flow (Stream 8) 
XMEAS(6) Reactor feed rate (Stream6) 
XMEAS(7) Reactor pressure 
XMEAS(8) Reactor level 
XMEAS(9) Reactor temperature 
 
XMEAS(10) Purge rate (Stream 9) 
XMEAS(11) Separator temperature 
XMEAS(12) Separator level 
XMEAS(13) Separator pressure 
XMEAS(14) Separator underflow (Stream 10) 
XMEAS(15) Stripper level 
XMEAS(16) Stripper pressure 
XMEAS(17) Stripper underflow (Stream 11) 
XMEAS(18) Stripper temperature 
XMEAS(19) Stripper steam flow 
XMEAS(20) Compressor work 
XMEAS(21) Reactor Cooling Water Outlet temperature 
XMEAS(22) Separator cooling water outlet temperature 
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Table 3. 9. Fault scenarios in TE 
Fault no. Fault description 
IDV(6) A step in feed loss in A 
IDV(12) A random variation in condenser cooling water inlet temperature 
 
First abnormal event: The first faulty scenario is related to a normal operation for 500 seconds 
and a loss in A feed for remaining 500 seconds. This variation will affect the concentration of all 
components in the reactor. Consequently, this may change the process parameters in reactor and 
downstream units.  
Based on KPCA performance on these scenarios the T2 statistic was equal to 21.5 that is obtained 
based on confidence level of 0.95 and selection of four principal components, which show 85% of 
the variation in the system. Gaussian kernel function was selected in data analysis. As it is obvious 
in Fig. 3.9a there is a sharp jump in Hotelling T2 values and they exceed the threshold 
instantaneously when the abnormality initiated indicating that KPCA is able to detect the A feed 
loss quickly. The contribution plot of this scenario is also given in Fig. 3.9b. In this abnormal event 
the following variables have high contribution among other variables: 
 XMEAS(1): A feed  
 XMEAS(7): reactor pressure 
  XMEAS(9): reactor temperature 
  XMEAS(10): purge rate 
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 XMEAS(20): compressor work 
 XMEAS(21): reactor cooling water outlet temperature 
This indicates that a loss in A feed will affect the reactor and the compressor and the upstream of 
the separator that seems reasonable from process point of view. The reactants in this process are 
gaseous and a drop in the flow rate of one of these reactants will affect the pressure of the reactor. 
Also a loss in A feed concentration will deviate the kinetic of the reaction in the reactor since there 
is an exothermic reaction in the reactor and it may lead to variation in reactor temperature. 
Consequently the outcome of reactor will be different of normal outcome and this will affect the 
downstream units.  It should be noted that the reactant A will be stripped in the stripper and the 
downstream product of stripper does not contain the reactant A. It is obvious that a loss in A feed 
will affect the composition of the final downstream product. However, since this paper did not 
take into account the composition of different materials as variables and only considered the 
process variables, in contribution plot the parameters of stripper have not high value of 
contribution on abnormal process variation. Considering these variables, it is difficult to accurately 
find which variable is most suspected to be the true root cause of the fault. So it is substantial to 
now the cause and effect relation between variables involved in the process. 
The causality analysis methods suffer from the complexity of calculation when too many variables 
are involved in the calculations. Also, implementation of causality analysis on all variables in the 
process will not have precise and reliable fault diagnostic results because when there are too many 
variables, the constructed network based on causality analysis will be too complex, busy and 
difficult to qualitatively determine the root cause of the fault (Fig. 3.1b). So causality analysis was 
performed on the variables selected through KPCA in order to have a less busy network which 
facilitates the aim of fault diagnosis. Based on the Granger causality test on the most contributed 
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variables of this abnormal scenario (Table 3.10a) a simple networks will be constructed as in Fig. 
3.10a. In this table the variables in first column are cause and the variables in the first row are 
effect variables. If the prob<0.05, the variable in column has influence on the variable in row. For 
example probXMEAS(7)→XMEAS(9)= 0.0000. It means XMEAS(7) which is rector pressure has 
influence on XMEAS(9) which is reactor temperature. However, XMEAS(7), or reactor pressure, 
has not influence on XMEAS(1), which is A feed stream,  because probXMEAS(7)→XMEAS(1)= 0.1093. 
On the first faulty scenario and based on the first row of Table 3.10a, A feed stream has influence 
on reactor pressure. Based on second row, reactor pressure has influence on reactor temperature 
and based on the third row, reactor temperature has influence on purge rate, compressor work, and 
reactor cooling water outlet temperature. Based on this table one can construct a network 
containing six nodes and five arcs as it is shown in Fig. 3.10a. In order to further investigate the 
causal dependency between these nodes, the mutual transfer entropy values were computed for all 
pairs of this abnormal event (Table 3.11a). These results are in accordance with that of Granger 
causality and the constructed network based on transfer entropy is the same as Granger causality. 
As a result the constructed network based on causality analysis in all scenarios is sparse enough to 
guide us to find the root cause of the fault in the process. The proposed methodology finds A feed, 
XMEAS(1) as the main cause of fault since, according to figure 3.10a, this variable has influence 
on other variables while it is not affected by other variables. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.9. KPCA results for Tennessee Eastman (a) T2 Hotelling. Contribution plots for (b) 
IDV(6) (c) IDV(12) 
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Second abnormal event: The second fault is related to a normal operation of the process for 500 
seconds and then the fault initiated with a random variation in condenser cooling water inlet 
temperature. This variable is not among measured variables. The source variables connected to 
this fault are in literatures [89]. 
Since the training data for both faulty scenarios in Tennessee Eastman are the same, the KPCA 
model construction for the second faulty scenario is the same as the first one. Figure 3.9a shows 
the departure of T2 values beyond the threshold (threshold=21.5). Although the first faulty scenario 
that was a step variation in the process was detected abruptly, the detection of the second fault that 
is a kind of random variation in the process variable deals with a delay. The main reason is because 
the magnitude of the variation in condenser cooling water inlet temperature is less than the 
magnitude of the step in A feed flow rate. The contribution plot is given in Fig. 3.9c. The following 
variables have high contribution to this fault: 
 XMEAS(9): reactor temperature 
 XMEAS(11): separator temperature 
 XMEAS(13): separator pressure 
  XMEAS(14): separator underflow 
 XMEAS(16): stripping pressure 
  XMEAS(17): stripping underflow 
 XMEAS(21) : reactor cooling water outlet temperature 
Since this fault affects whole units of the process even the most downstream unit which is stripper, 
it seems that whole the process is under influence of this fault. 
53 
 
For the second abnormal event and based on the first row of Table 3.10b, reactor temperature has 
influence on both separator temperature and reactor cooling water outlet temperature. Bases on the 
second row, separator temperature has influence on separator pressure. The third row shows that 
the separator pressure affect the separator underflow and the forth row shows that separator 
underflow affects stripping pressure and stripping underflow. The constructed network is given on 
Fig. 3.10b. In order to further investigate the causal dependency between these nodes, the mutual 
transfer entropy values were computed for all pairs between variables selected by KPCA (Table 
3.11). These results are in accordance with that of Granger causality and the constructed network 
based on transfer entropy is the same as Granger causality. As a result the constructed network 
based on causality analysis in all scenarios is sparse enough to guide us to find the root cause of 
the fault. For this faulty scenario, when there is a random variation in condenser cooling water 
inlet temperature, reactor temperature was accurately diagnosed as failure cause. Since there is no 
measurement in condenser cooling water inlet temperature, this method is able to find the variable 
that is mostly affected by the main root (XMEAS(9)) and is able to propagate the fault to other 
variables.  
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Table 3.10. Granger causality test for Tennessee Eastman process. (a) IDV6, (b) IDV12 
 XMEAS(1) XMEAS(7) XMEAS(9) XMEAS(10) XMEAS(20) XMEAS(21)  
XMEAS(1) - 
- 
34654.89 
0.0000 
833.43 
0.5422 
184.83 
0.634 
8333.3 
0.234 
9034 
0.2338 
Chi-
sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(7) 843.54 
0.1093 
- 
- 
23856.23 
0.0000 
4903.94 
0.2954 
8473.5 
0.2393 
232.43 
0.5423 
Chi-
sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(9) 9433.34 
0.5343 
5433.5 
0.3433 
- 
- 
65921.45 
0.0252 
32403.34 
0.0000 
65332.5 
0.0000 
Chi-
sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(10) 465.54 
0.6743 
845.64 
0.5323 
8394.4 
0.09842 
- 
- 
938.53 
0.7643 
9545.4 
0.1235 
Chi-
sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(20) 9034.3 
0.4354 
584.43 
0.5434 
129.64 
0.76483 
7845.54 
0.3435 
- 
- 
834.34 
0.1334 
Chi-
sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(21) 14924.4 
0.0754 
9453.45 
0.3234 
49334.34 
0.06343 
4544.24 
0.3434 
233.34 
0.74453 
- 
- 
Chi-
sq 
Prob. 
 (a) 
 XMEAS(9) XMEAS(11) XMEAS(13) XMEAS(14) XMEAS(16) XMEAS(17) XMEAS(21)  
XMEAS(9) - 
- 
4323.23 
0.0000 
20394.23 
0.32932 
232.32 
0.3343 
3498.343 
0.23543 
83439.34 
0.5343 
34782.23 
0.0000 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(11) 89.5343 
0.6745 
- 
- 
98343 
0.0000 
89.34 
0.4343 
89394.3 
0.3434 
3534.34 
0.07644 
949.33 
0.5343 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(13) 8634.3 
0.64553 
1244.44 
0.3352 
- 
- 
6444.3 
0.0000 
9543.3 
0.3353 
53433.3 
0.5333 
4343.23 
0.09443 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(14) 8349.3 
0.0934 
789.98 
0.7866 
4578.7 
0.3447 
- 
- 
58909.09 
0.0000 
9579.87 
0.0000 
8906.8 
0.1009 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(16) 9324.43 
0.5453 
7343.343 
0.5434 
8343.22 
0.2232 
39083.34 
0.4334 
- 
- 
4434.44 
0.5433 
66.97 
0.6997 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(17) 9384.34 
0.4534 
834.33 
0.4332 
8422.2 
0.4222 
7278.254 
0.9873 
1222.22 
0.3222 
- 
- 
8732.2 
0.2433 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
XMEAS(21) 76304.3 
0.54347 
1.4323 
0.8837 
52.432 
0.4382 
9722.33 
0.75222 
97622.2 
0.0683 
655.33 
0.8722 
- 
- 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
 
(b) 
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Table 3.11. Transfer entropy between the most effective variables in two faulty scenarios in 
Tennessee Eastman (a) IDV6, (b) IDV12 
 XMEAS(1) XMEAS(7) XMEAS(9) XMEAS(10) XMEAS(20) XMEAS(21) 
XMEAS(1) - 0.22 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
XMEAS(7) - - 0.43 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
XMEAS(9) - - - 0.45 0.32 0.23 
XMEAS(10) - - - - <0.1 <0.1 
XMEAS(20) - - - - - <0.1 
XMEAS(21) - - - - - - 
(a) 
 XMEAS(9) XMEAS(11) XMEAS(13) XMEAS(14) XMEAS(16) XMEAS(17) XMEAS(21) 
XMEAS(9) - 0.23 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.55 
XMEAS(11) - - 0.43 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
XMEAS(13) - - - 0.19 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
XMEAS(14) - - - - 0.53 0.48 <0.1 
XMEAS(16) - - - - - <0.1 <0.1 
XMEAS(17) - - - - - - <0.1 
XMEAS(21) - - - - - - - 
(b) 
X(9)
X(11)
X(21)
X(14)
X(17)
X(13)
X(16)
X(1)
X(7)
X(9)
X(21) X(10) X(20)
(a) (b)
 
Figure 3.10. Constructed networks based on proposed technique for Tennessee Eastman process. 
(a) IDV6, (b) IDV12 
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3.4. Conclusion 
Although KPCA is a powerful tool in multivariate analysis for detection and even in identification 
of faults, it suffers in linking the fault to its root cause. In case of an abnormality on an industrial 
process, it is difficult for an operator to have an accurate diagnosis of the root cause of a fault 
based on the contribution plots in KPCA analysis. Besides, contribution plots may contain spurious 
contributions that are related to noise in the process variables. In such a case, combining KPCA 
with another method is worthwhile. Here it was shown that KPCA combined with causality 
analysis is an appropriate tool for process fault detection and diagnosis. The importance of this 
methodology is due to providing a visual cause and effect description among the variables that are 
most suspected to be the root cause of the fault. The proposed methodology was applied to FCC 
and Tennessee Eastman Chemical process. In both examples KPCA was able to detect the fault 
but could not diagnose the main cause of fault. Based on network construction, causality analysis 
diagnosed the root cause of the fault and showed the propagations pathway of the fault to other 
affected variables. Also in both examples, causality analysis was done by both transfer entropy 
and granger causality test and comparison between them verifies the previous theories in this area: 
when the process variables have Gaussian, exponential Weinman, or log-normal data distribution, 
Granger causality has the same result as transfer entropy which represents the amount of 
information that transfers from one variable to other neighbor or non-neighbor variable.[75, 76]. 
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Chapter 4 
Root cause diagnosis of process fault using KPCA and Bayesian network 
Abstract: This paper develops a methodology to combine diagnostic information from various 
fault detection and isolation tools to diagnose the true root cause of an abnormal event in industrial 
processes. Limited diagnostic information from kernel principal component analysis (KPCA), 
other on-line fault detection and diagnostic tools, and process knowledge were combined through 
Bayesian belief network (BBN). The proposed methodology will enable an operator to diagnose 
the root cause of the abnormality. Further, some challenge on application of Bayesian network on 
process fault diagnosis such as network connection determination, estimation of conditional 
probabilities, and cyclic loop handling were addressed. The proposed methodology was applied to 
Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit and Tennessee Eastman Chemical Process. In both cases, the 
proposed approach showed a good capability of diagnosing root cause of abnormal condition.  
4.1. Introduction 
In process industries, there has been a continuing demand for higher quality products and lower 
product rejection rates, satisfying increasingly stringent safety and environmental regulations [1]. 
Implementation and improvement of accurate control scheme have been essential over the recent 
decades in order to meet these ever increasing standards [90]. Modern control systems became 
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extremely complex by integrating various functions and components for sophisticated 
performance requirement [3, 40]. With such complexities in hardware and software, it is natural 
that the system may become vulnerable to faults in practice and fault diagnostic tools are required 
to ensure the process safety and quality of products. The objectives of these tools are early 
detection of faults and to minimize the impact of a fault on the system [3]. 
In the recent years extensive research has been conducted on process fault detection and diagnosis 
(FDD). According to the comprehensive review of Venkatasubramanian et al., FDD tools can be 
divided to model-based methods and process history based methods [4, 10, 23]. Model based 
methods require precise mathematical relationship between internal states of the process. Most of 
the times is impossible to have such a precise model [14, 91]. History based methods uses the data 
of the process that contain all normal and abnormal condition in the process and implement these 
data for training and fault detection purpose [92]. Although these methods are effective to detect 
faults early and widely used in process industries, the diagnosis of the faults is not precise. Various 
residual evaluation methods have been developed to uniquely identify the fault location, for 
example, generalized likelihood ratio test [15], and structured residuals [93].  However, the 
inaccuracy in fault diagnosis still exists and often these methods point towards response variables 
as the root cause. 
In order to overcome the limitations of individual methods and improve the diagnose ability of 
process faults, hybrid methods have been proposed by researches in recent years. A hybrid 
framework consists of collection of methods and utilizes information from several FDDs to 
overcome the limitations of individual methods [5-7]. This combination of different methods 
allows one to evaluate different kinds of knowledge in one single framework for better decision 
making [7]. For instance, the analytical methods in model-based fault detection and diagnosis are 
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based on residual generation using parameter estimation; however, the robustness of the model-
based methods is often under question since obtaining an accurate model for process, especially 
for chemical processes, is challenging.  To address this problem, Frank proposed the use of 
analytical methods and integrated them with knowledge-based methods. He combined the 
analytical methods with expert system approach which makes use of qualitative models based on 
available information of the process, facts and rules. Degree of ageing, used tools and history of 
operation are examples of expert knowledge. They concluded that knowledge-based methods 
complement the shortcomings of analytical methods of fault diagnosis [16]. An integration of 
neural network and expert system for fault diagnosis was done by Becraft et al. Once the process 
fault was localized by neural network, the results were analyzed by a deep knowledge expert 
system including information of the system structure, function and principles of operation [64]. 
Mylaraswamy provided a brief comparison of the various diagnostic methods to highlight the 
inadequacy of individual methods and underscored the need for collective problem solving. They 
proposed a Dkit based hybrid method of neural network for detection of a fault and a SDG for 
diagnostic action [6].  Zhao et al. proposed a wavelet-sigmoid basis neural network for dynamic 
diagnosis of failure in hydrocracking process [5].  
Process measurements are very noisy and there is uncertainty in the relationship between process 
variables. A BN model is an excellent tool to characterize processes with stochastic uncertainty 
using conditional probability-based state transitions [57]. Hence, it can be adopted to identify the 
propagating probabilities among different measurement variables so as to determine the operating 
status of processes and diagnose the root causes of abnormal events [56]. Researchers have used 
BN for improving process fault diagnosis in different ways. Due to stochastic nature of process 
variation, a false alarm may be generated in monitoring system while the process is operating in 
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normal condition. To address this problem, in the methodology proposed by Dey et al., data from 
multiple sensors were combined through a causal belief network to estimate probabilistic diagnosis 
of root cause of the process fault. They showed that the posterior probability of each node which 
shows the status of the node can be updated from evidence using Pearl massage passing algorithm 
[56]. Yu et. al proposed a Bayesian inference-based abnormality likelihood index to detect a 
process fault. In diagnosis phase they utilized dynamic Bayesian probability and contribution 
indices [57]. In complex processes, it is not economic to monitor all the variables while sometimes 
fault is originated in the non-monitored variables. To address this issue, Yu et al. investigated the 
possibility of combining modified ICA and BN for process FDD. The limited diagnostic results of 
ICA was used as evidence in BN updating and concluded that the combined framework of these 
two methods is a strong tool for FDD purpose for all monitored and non-monitored variables [36]. 
Despite these researches, there is still more need to research in this area especially since it is 
somewhat unclear how to use the outcome of data-based FDD methods as an input to the 
knowledge based root cause analysis in an automated fashion. Also in these researches, the causal 
relationships in the network were determined using process knowledge and conditional 
probabilities are assigned based on expert judgement which is subjective as it heavily depends on 
the knowledge and experience of individuals. Furthermore, there is ambiguity in whether one 
should use normal or faulty data for network training and details on preprocessing of training data 
is not discussed [36, 57].  Some application challenges arise due to the inherent limitations of 
Bayesian network. A BN in its original form is an acyclic directed graph. In chemical processes, 
however, cyclic loops appear due to material and heat integration; recycle streams, as well as 
information flow paths due to feedback control. As such, BNs needs to be adopted to represent 
chemical processes adequately. 
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Our research aims to fill these knowledge gaps with view to developing a comprehensive methods 
that can precisely diagnose the root cause of process fault and help the operator to take corrective 
actions. We propose a new methodology through integration of diagnostic information from 
various single variable and multivariable diagnostic tools using BN. We also address the 
application difficulties of BN related to process fault diagnosis. We used Granger causality and 
transfer entropy to determine the causal relationships between process variables. A detailed 
methodology for estimating conditional probabilities between variables is also proposed in this 
paper. Cyclic networks were dealt with through transformation of cyclic BN to acyclic-BN using 
pseudo-nodes. We demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed methodology through two case 
studies, i.e. FCC and Tennessee Eastman.  
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Conditional probability 
estimation
True root 
cause
Identifying the monitored 
faulty variable from 
contribution plots
Create a dummy 
point
Network construction
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Figure 4.1. The proposed method for root cause diagnosis of process fault 
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4.2. Methodology: BN-based process monitoring approach 
The overall picture of the methodology is given in Fig. 4.1. The main components of the proposed 
methodology are: KPCA model, sensor fault detection module, and BN.  In an on-line setting 
KPCA will act as a primary tool for detecting process fault. Having detected the fault, next step 
would be to diagnose the root cause of the fault and the propagation pathway. The fault may be 
originated among internal states or it may be because of a sensor malfunction. It is important to 
isolate sensor faults using sensor validation module since these kind of faults breakdown the 
correlation between variables and the causality networks do not work effectively. A sensor check 
module can be designed using simple rule-based algorithms or more sophisticated algorithms such 
as bank of Kalman filter with weighted sum of squared residual (WSSR)  [94]. To keep the 
methodology simple, we used a rule-based algorithm.  If the sensors are working properly, the 
failure should be among process internal states. The BN is more appropriate to detect disturbance 
type faults. Thus, if it is a sensor fault the algorithm stops at this point. Otherwise it will proceed 
to determining the root cause of the fault. The average contributions calculated from the KPCA is 
used to preliminarily diagnose the causes of faults. This information is passed on to the trained BN 
as evidence. The trained BN based on its causal relations and conditional probabilities determine 
the true root cause of the fault. The training of the KPCA and BN is done in an off-line mode. 
Important steps in building a KPCA model are data normalization, determining the number of PCs, 
residual generation using training data set.  
BN has two components: construction of causal network and estimating the conditional 
probabilities. Granger causality and transfer entropy was applied for estimation of mutual causal 
relationship between variables and for construction of network. Knowledge of the process was 
used to verify the constructed network. If the network contained a loop, a dummy duplicate node 
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was created for one of the variables involved in the loop because Bayesian network cannot update 
cycles. Conditional probabilities among different nodes are the quantitative part of the network 
which was calculated using maximum likelihood method. Our objective was to reflect the causal 
relationships among the variables due to abnormal events as such we used the residuals from the 
KPCA to calculate the conditional probabilities. The residuals contain only the abnormal process 
variations thus conditional probabilities calculated from the residuals better reflect the propagation 
pathways of the faults. More detail on each section is presented in following sections: 
4.2.1. Kernel Principal Component analysis (KPCA) 
KPCA is an extension of PCA to deal with nonlinear data set. In KPCA, nonlinear data can be 
converted to linear form through high-dimensional mapping. For example, a data set x and z which 
are not separable in current space are linearly separable in nonlinear hyperplane with features Фi(x) 
and Фj(z). Thus KPCA is a two-step method: calculation of covariance matrix and dot products of 
variables in feature space, and singular value decomposition of covariance matrix in feature space. 
Finding the exact feature space is not straight forward and calculation of the dot products in the 
feature space can be prohibitive due to calculation complexities. Instead of explicitly transforming 
variables to feature space, dot product vectors in feature space is calculated using Kernel function. 
According to [87] the dot product of the transformed variables is given by the following equation: 
𝑘(𝑥, 𝑧) = Ф𝑖(𝑥).Ф𝑗(𝑧)      (4.1) 
The function k (·, ·) is called the kernel function, and there exist several types of these functions. 
Some popular kernel functions are polynomial functions, Gaussian functions, and sigmoidal 
functions [28, 32].  The fault detection in KPCA is done using Hotelling T2 which is similar to 
PCA. The contributions of each variable reflect some useful information in diagnosis. However, 
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unlike PCA contribution of KPCA model cannot be calculated easily because of the nonlinear 
transformation in KPCA. Alcala and Qin proposed reconstruction-based contribution (RBC) to 
overcome the aforementioned shortcoming and to estimate contribution of each variable [87, 88]. 
The procedure to estimate fault free data by eliminating the effect of fault from faulty data is 
defined as reconstruction. 
𝑧𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝜉𝑖𝑓𝑖       (4.2) 
where zi is fault free data, xi is faulty data, 𝜉i is the direction of fault, and fi is the magnitude of 
fault.  RBC considers the reconstruction of a fault detection index (T2 or SPE) along the direction 
of a variable as the variable's contribution for that fault. In other words, the objective of RBC is to 
find fi of a vector with direction 𝜉i such that the fault detection index of the reconstructed 
measurement is minimized. The reason for minimization is that for fault free data the detection 
index should be minimum; however it is not zero because there is always some process normal 
variation and noise in a process. 
The residuals from the KPCA module were used to update the probability of the corresponding 
nodes in the BN. The residual components are calculated from: 
?̃? = 𝑃𝑓
𝑇Ф       (4.3) 
Where Pf
T   is related eigenvectors corresponding to remained PCs which are related to residuals 
and Φ is the mapped vector of observation space. The calculation of residual from equation 4.3 is 
not possible because of high dimensionality in feature space. Here we calculated residuals from 
the difference between faulty data and fault free data which is obtained from reconstruction: 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖       (4.4) 
More details and the mathematics behind the theory is given in Appendix.  
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4.2.2. Sensor failure module 
In the proposed method, a rule-based sensor check module has been designed after KPCA unit to 
isolate sensor malfunction. According to Sharma et al. the following failures are probable in a 
sensor [95]: 
 FLAT LINE: The sensor reports a constant value for a large number of successive samples 
(Fig. 4.2b). 
 SPIKE: A sharp change in the measured value between two successive data points (Fig. 
4.2c).  
 NOISE: The variance of the sensor readings increases. Unlike SPIKE faults that affect a 
single sample at a time, NOISE faults affect a number of successive samples (Fig. 4.2d).  
In order to keep things simple we used the following rules to detect these faults: 
 When the difference between two consecutive observations is less than a very small value 
and this happens for five consecutive observations, the sensor is suspected to Flat line 
failure. 
 When the difference between two consecutive observations is a very large number in 
comparison with the standard deviation of data, the sensor is suspected to Spike failure. 
  If in any data window of N data points, q measured values of a sensor exceed the threshold, 
the sensor is suspected for Noise failure. 
Pseudo-code to apply the above heuristics is given in Fig. 4.3.  
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(d) 
 
Figure 4.2. Normal and faulty states of a sensor (a) Normal performance (b) flat line fault (c) 
spike fault (d) noise fault 
 
1. Input
Data- a m*n matrix (m: observations, n: variables)
2. Output: a diagnosis report
3. For each sensor si ϵ n
4.       If  Data( p+1, i)-Data( p,i) < ϵ  … (for five consecutive observations)
5.           Break
6.           Sensor →suspected
7.       If max(or min)-mean>> st.dev
8.            Break
9.            Sensor → suspected
10. If abs(m values- mean)> threshould for q samples a in window size N (N and q <m)
11.            Break
12.            sensor→suspected
13. if suspected
                       report →sensor fault diagnosed
 
Figure 4.3. Pseudo-code for sensor fault detection 
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4.2.3. Bayesian network construction 
A BN is utilized to determine the fault origin and the pathway in which the fault is propagated. 
BN has two components: the causality network and conditional probabilities. Typically, in most 
cases the causal relationship and conditional probabilities are assigned based on process 
knowledge. In this study we show how to use process data to complement process knowledge. In 
order to construct the network, the mutual cause and effect relationship between variables should 
be determined. We employed Granger causality and transfer entropy to extract causal relationships 
among variables from process data. The detailed explanation on causality analysis and construction 
of the BN is described below: 
4.2.3.1. Causality analysis based on Granger Causality 
Wiener introduced the concept of history based causality, and later in 1969 Granger formulated it 
to show the cause and effect relationship among different variables in any system [69, 81]. 
According to Granger, a variable 'y ' Granger causes the other variable 'x ' if incorporating the past 
values of 'x' and 'y ' helps to better predict the future of 'x ' than incorporating the past values of 'x 
' alone [69]. Considering two time series x and y, there are two different linear regression model. 
One is a restricted model in which the prediction of x at time k is possible using the information of 
the past values of x: 
𝑥𝑘 = ∑ µ𝑖𝑥𝑘−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑥𝑘
𝑝
𝑖=1       (4.5) 
where xk is the value of x at time k; xk-i is the i-lagged value of x; µ is the regression coefficient; p 
is the number of time lagged variables considered; and ε denotes the residual series for constructing 
xk.  
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The second model is unrestricted model in which the prediction of x at time t is possible using the 
past information of both x and y as follows: 
𝑥𝑘 = ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑘−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑘−𝑗 + 𝜂𝑥𝑘
𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑝
𝑖=1     (4.6) 
where xk is the x time series at time k; xk-i and yk-j are respectively the i-lagged x time series and j-
lagged y time series; γ  and β are the regression coefficients; p and q are the amount of lag 
considered or model order; and  η denotes the unrestricted model residual at time k. The µ, β, and 
γ parameters are calculated using least squares method. A small value of p or q leads to poor model 
estimation while large values result in problem of overfitting. Akaike Information criterion (AIC) 
[82] and Bayesian Information criterion (BIC) [66] are two criteria that are used to determine the 
model order. AIC and BIC are given as follows:  
𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝛴)) + 
2𝑝𝑛2
𝑇
     (4.7) 
𝐵𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝛴)) + 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇)𝑝𝑛2
𝑇
     (4.8) 
where Σ represents the noise covariance matrix and T is the total number of observations. When 
the variability of the residual of the unrestricted model is significantly reduced with that of a 
restricted model, then there is an improvement in the prediction of x due to y. In other words y is 
said to Granger cause x. This improvement can be measured by the F statistic: 
𝐹 = 
(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑟−𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑟) 𝑞⁄
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑟 (𝑇−𝑝−𝑞−1)⁄
~ 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑇 − 𝑝 − 𝑞 − 1)    (4.9) 
where RSSr is the sum of the squares of the restricted model residual, RSSur is the sum of the 
squares of unrestricted model residual, and T is the total number of observations used to estimate 
the model. F statistics approximately follows F distribution with degrees of freedom p and (T-p-
70 
 
q-1). If the F statistics from y to x is significant, then the unrestricted model yields a better 
explanation of x than does the restricted model, and y is said to Granger cause x [84]. 
4.2.3.2. Causality analysis based on Transfer entropy 
For two variables with sampling interval of τ , xi= [xi,  xi-τ, … ; xi-(k-1) τ] and yi=[yi, yi- τ,  … , yi-(l-1) 
τ],  information transferred from y to x is defined as follows [71]: 
𝑡(𝑥│𝑦) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖+ℎ, 𝒙𝑖, 𝒚𝑖)  . 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑃(𝑥𝑖+ℎ│ 𝒙𝑖 ,𝒚𝑖)
𝑃(𝑥𝑖+ℎ│𝒙𝑖)
𝑥𝑖+ℎ,𝒙𝑖,𝒚𝑖   (4.10) 
where P(.) denotes the probability density function (PDF) and h is the prediction horizon. k and l 
show the length of time series. Transfer entropy represents the measure of information transfer 
from y to x by measuring the reduction of uncertainty while assuming predictability [71]. It is 
defined as the difference between the information about a future observation of x obtained from 
the simultaneous observation of past values of both x and y, and the information about the future 
of x using only past values of x. It was shown that the parameter values can be chosen as: τ = h ≤ 
4, k = 0, and l = 1 for the initial trial [68]. Using the above definitions, direction and amount of 
net information transfer from y to x is as follows: 
𝑡(𝑦 → 𝑥) = 𝑡(𝑥│𝑦) − 𝑡(𝑦|𝑥)     (4.11) 
𝑡(𝑦 → 𝑥) is causality measure and is derived by comparing the influence of y to x with influence 
of x to y. If t(𝑦 → 𝑥) is negative then information is transferred from x to y. Since at first there is 
no knowledge about which node is cause and which one is effect, choosing these nodes inversely 
will result in negative value.   
The advantage of using transfer entropy is that it is a model free method and can be applied to non-
linear data. It has already been proved to be very effective in capturing process topology and 
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process connectivity [96]. But it suffers from a large computational burden due to the calculation 
of the PDFs. Histograms or nonparametric methods, e.g. kernel method, can be used to estimate 
the PDF [71]. The Gaussian kernel function is used to estimate the PDF which is defined as 
follows: 
𝐾(𝑣) =
1
√2𝜋
𝑒−
1
2
𝑣2
       (4.12) 
Therefore, a univariate PDF can be estimated by, 
𝑝(𝑥) =
1
𝑁.𝑑
∑ 𝐾 (
𝑥−𝑥𝑖
𝑑
)𝑁𝑖=1       (4.13) 
where N is the number of samples, d is the bandwidth chosen to minimize the error of estimated 
PDF. d is calculated by d = c.σ.N0.2 where σ is variance and c = (4/3)0.2≈1.06 according to the 
“normal reference rule-of-thumb” approach. For a q-dimensional multivariate case the estimated 
PDF is given by [71]: 
𝑃(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑞) =
1
𝑁.𝑑1…𝑑𝑞
∑ 𝐾 (
𝑥1−𝑥𝑖1
𝑑1
) . 𝐾 (
𝑥𝑞−𝑥𝑖𝑞
𝑑𝑞
)𝑁𝑖=1   (4.14) 
where 𝑑𝑠 = 𝑐. σ(𝑥𝑖,𝑠)𝑖=1
𝑁
. 𝑁
−1
(4+𝑞)⁄  for 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑞. 
4.2.3.3. Estimation of conditional probabilities 
Besides the causal network, a BN contains conditional probability tables for all nodes. These 
values quantify the amount of influence each node receives from its parents. In this paper, 
calculation of conditional probabilities was done by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
Suppose a sample consisting of m variables and n observations. We write xj
(i) for the j’th 
observation of i’th variable. Given these definitions, the MLE for P(x) for x∈{1 . . . k} takes the 
following form (k is the number of states): 
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𝑃(𝑥) =
∑ [𝑥𝑗
(𝑖)
=𝑥]𝑛𝑗=1
𝑛
=
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑥)
𝑛
     (4.15) 
[x(i)=x] is 1 if x(i)=x, otherwise it is equal to zero. Hence, ∑ [𝑥(𝑖) = 𝑥] = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑥)𝑛𝑖=1   is simply 
the number of times that the state x is seen in the training set, or number of times that state x is 
inside threshold that have been previously determined.  
Similarly, the MLE for the P(x│y) , x and yϵ {1….k}, takes the following form: 
𝑃(𝑥|𝑦) =
𝑃(𝑥,𝑦)
𝑃(𝑦)
 
∑ [𝑥𝑗
(𝑖)
=𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑗
(𝑖)
=𝑦]𝑛𝑗=1
∑ [𝑦
𝑗
(𝑖)
=𝑦]𝑛𝑗=1
=
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑗(𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦)
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑦)
  (4.16) 
This is a very natural estimate and equal to the number of times state both x and y  are seen within 
the threshold upon the number of times the label y is seen within the threshold [85]. 
In a process system, propagation path for fault and normal variation is often not the same [97]. 
The conditional probability in essence should reflect the causal relations between variables under 
faulty conditions.  In order to keep only the variation of abnormality and noise and to mitigate the 
effect of process variation on the conditional probability calculation, the residuals from KPCA 
analysis were used for calculation of conditional probabilities (Fig. 4.6). Also the residuals follow 
Gaussian distribution more closely compared to the raw data, as such gives better maximum 
likelihood estimates. In other words, conversion of data to residuals will mitigate process 
variations in variable values while keeping the causality of fault information inside, consequently 
conditional probabilities estimated from residuals reflect the causal relations for faulty variables 
more accurately.  
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4.2.3.4. Construction of BN: An illustrative example 
We will illustrate the network construction using Granger causality and transfer entropy and also 
estimation of conditional probabilities, for a simple dissolution tank system. [34]. In this system 
pure solid crystal is dissolved in a tank with water (Fig. 4.4). The flow of water to the tank is under 
control. Also the solid crystals are fed from a hopper to the tank through a rotary feeder. The 
control objective of this process is to maintain the level of water and concentration of crystal in 
the tank to desired set point. However, these two parameters are subjected to abnormal changes 
due to disturbance in the solid discharge.  
There are four variables in this process, water flow to the tank, RPM of the rotary feeder, level of 
water, and concentration of solid crystal in the tank. These four variables are taken as nodes in a 
network and their values within the operation of the process will be analyzed by Granger causality 
and transfer entropy for network construction. We used a statistical software Eviews to perform 
Granger causality analysis. The results of Granger causality analysis are shown in Table 4.1. In 
this table based on the F statistics when the prob<0.05, it rejects the null hypothesis and indicates 
the variable in the row has influence on the variable in column. For example, based on the first 
row of this table, water flow has influence on level and solid crystal concentration. Also the second 
row shows that the RPM has influence on level and solid crystal concentration as well. The 
network constructed based on this method is shown Fig. 4.5. Also we did causality analysis of the 
same system using transfer entropy. The results of transfer entropy are given in Table 4.2. In this 
model, there is time lag between inputs and outputs. In calculation of transfer entropy, several time 
delay values in the range of [-5:5] were considered and the value with the maximum transfer 
entropy was selected.  In Table 4.2, the value of transfer entropy indicates that the variables in 
rows have influence on the variables in columns. However, by comparison of the network 
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constructed by Granger causality and transfer entropy, there is a discrepancy in the results. Based 
on transfer entropy level of the tank has effect on solid crystal concentration; however, Granger 
causality does not confirm such a relation. The results of Granger causality are more accurate than 
that of transfer entropy because in calculation of conditional probability values of transfer entropy 
test, histograms were used that introduced some error to the calculation. In order to rectify the 
results, a threshold of 0.1 was set for transfer entropy values; only values above the threshold 
indicates that there is a significant causal relationship between the variables.  
 
 
Figure 4.4. Process flow diagram of dissolution tank system 
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Table 4.1. The result of Granger causality analysis for dissolution tank system 
 Water flow RPM Level Concentration  
Water flow - 
- 
66.65 
0.1253 
53239.33 
0.0000 
4554.66 
0.0000 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
RPM 0.7632 
0.6466 
- 
- 
3424.43 
0.0000 
76434.5 
0.0000 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
Level 53.332 
0.7524 
0.7613 
0.0934 
- 
- 
949.43 
0.5322 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
Concentration 13.644 
0.8323 
6347.3 
0.0784 
361.54 
0.1125 
- 
- 
Chi-sq 
Prob. 
 
Table 4.2. Mutual transfer entropy values between nodes on dissolution tank system 
 water in Solid level concentration 
water in NA NA 0.16 0.25 
Solid NA NA 0.14 0.19 
Level NA NA NA 0.02 
 
Water 
flow
RPM
Level
Conc.
 
Figure 4.5. Constructed network for dissolution tank system using Granger causality and transfer 
entropy 
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Next we calculated the conditional probabilities for the system. Fig. 4.6 shows 2000 observations 
for level and water flow rate and their corresponding residuals for the dissolution tank system. The 
training data containing two kinds of variation in the system: normal process variation and 
variation due to abnormality and noise. As can be seen in this figure, in the case of raw data there 
are many fluctuations in data and sometimes they exceed the threshold but in reality these were 
normal operational changes in the process. However this is not the issue in residuals as the 
residuals do not contain process variations. In case of level, 644 samples exceeded the threshold 
but in the corresponding residuals only 91 samples exceeded the threshold. Also in case of water 
flow rate, 782 samples exceeded the threshold but in the corresponding residuals only 114 samples 
exceeded the threshold which is reasonable because the selected PCs for this system shows 0.85 
of variation in the system. Considering one standard deviation around the mean as normal 
threshold, the probability of level of the tank being in normal state is 71% for original data and is 
93% for residuals. Also the probability of water flow rate being in normal state is 68% for original 
data and is 81% for residuals. This is because in original data some process normal variations are 
incorrectly considered as fault. So conditional probability values calculated from the residuals are 
more accurate than that of from raw data.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.6. Process value and generated residuals of dissolution tank system. (a) Level (b) water 
flow rate 
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4.2.4. Loop handling 
Since BN is acyclic network, while applying it for chemical processes with feedback controller or 
recycles, a special treatment is required to convert the network form cyclic to acyclic form. In 
order to capture the feedback effect in an acyclic network, we designed a duplicate dummy point 
as the feedback effect in recycle or controller. For example, in Fig. 4.7a, there is a causal 
relationship from Xi to Xo. Also based on the recycle loop there is a causal relationship from Xo to 
Xi as well. This loop has been treated as Fig. 4.7b and a dummy variable has been dedicated to 
variable Xi. It is obvious in Fig. 4.7b variable Xi has effect to variable Xo in the continuous line and 
also variable Xo has effect to variable Xi in the dash line.   
ProcessXi Xo outputinput
Xi Xo Xi Xo Xi
(a) (b)
 
 
Figure 4.7. Loop handling in Bayesian network 
4.3. Application of proposed methodology 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed hybrid technique based on KPCA and 
BN, the methodology was applied to two case studies, one without recycle (FCC) and one with 
recycle (Tennessee Eastman):  
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4.3.1. Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
FCC process converts a number of heavy hydrocarbons with different molecular weights to more 
lighter and more valuable hydrocarbons. The heavy hydrocarbons come from different parts of 
refinery and are diverse in chemical properties. A schematic illustration of the FCC unit 
reactor/regenerator section is shown in Fig. 4.8. The monitored variables are listed in Table 4.3. 
There are three inputs to the system: fresh feed temperature, feed coke factor and atmosphere 
temperature. Feed coke factor was maintained at 1.05 during the entire simulation. Two 
disturbances were introduced to the system through the other two inputs as described in Table 4.4 
[86]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Schematic illustration of FCC process 
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Table 4.3. Measured variable of FCC process 
No. symbol Variable 
1 Tair Air temperature 
Coking factor 
Fresh feed entering furnace 
2 Psi 
3 T1 
4 P4 Reactor pressure 
Differential pressure 
Air flow rate to regenerator 
5 DP 
6 Fair 
7 P6 Regenerator pressure 
8 T3 Furnace temperature 
9 T2 Fresh feed entering to riser 
10 Tr Riser temperature 
11 Treg Regenerator temperature 
12 Tcyc Cyclone temperature 
13 Csc Coke frac. In spent catalyst 
14 Crgc Coke frac. In regenerated catalyst 
 
Table 4.4. Fault scenarios in FCC 
Scenario No. Fault description 
1 5°C in atmosphere temperature 
2 Gradual increase of 10°C in fresh feed temperature 
 
81 
 
Fault scenarios: 
Step disturbance in ambient temperature: The first faulty scenario begins with normal 
operation for 1000 seconds and then is followed by a 5°C increase in ambient air temperature for 
the remaining 4000 seconds. The sampling time of the data generation is 1 second. The first 1000 
fault free samples were used as training data. Gaussian function was selected as kernel function 
for KPCA. All data are normalized around zero. Five principal components were selected that 
explain 85% of the variations in the system. The value of threshold was calculated as 9.71 at 95% 
of confidence level.  The Hotelling’s T2 and contribution plots of the KPCA analysis are shown in 
the Fig. 4.9. Based on Fig. 4.9a the Hotelling’s T2 identified departure from process normal 
condition. This plot depicts a successful detection of the abnormal condition. As can be seen, there 
is a long delay associated with the detection of this disturbance. It is because the magnitude of the 
variation in ambient temperature is not big enough to affect the process in a short time. Once the 
fault is detected, next step is to diagnose its root cause. The plot in Fig. 4.9c depicts the contribution 
plots to the T2. As it is obvious in Fig. 4.9c, when there is a disturbance in ambient temperature, 
the contribution plot cannot exactly diagnose the root cause of the fault, rather point towards few 
variables involved in the fault. However, regenerator pressure has the most contribution in this 
abnormal event, i.e. this variable has the highest variation among the variables in the propagation 
pathway of the fault. 
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Fig 4.9 (a) Hotelling T2 plot for disturbance in ambient air temperature in FCC 
 
Fig 4.9 (b) Hotelling T2 plot for disturbance in feed temperature in FCC 
 
Fig 4.9 (c) Contribution plot for disturbance in ambient air temperature in FCC 
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Fig 4.9 (d) Contribution plot for disturbance in feed temperature in FCC 
Having detected the fault, the first task is to determine whether this is a sensor fault or not. After 
testing all probable sensor faults, it was found that all sensors are working properly. Next we use 
BN to diagnose the root cause. In order to construct the network, all monitored variables and 
disturbances were considered as nodes. The cause and effect relationship between variables is 
determined by both causality analysis and process knowledge. Granger causality and transfer 
entropy were used to investigate the cause and effect relationship between variables and process 
knowledge that includes process flow diagram and expert knowledge were used as a confirmation 
to the constructed network. The conditional probabilities were obtained from historical data using 
MLE. In the historical data, both process faults were simulated (Table 4.4) and the data in training 
set are samples of all possible abnormal events. As explained in Section 4.2.4 the normal variation 
of process introduces inaccuracy in calculation of conditional probabilities.  Therefore, the 
residuals of KPCA were used for conditional probability estimation. 
When there is a variation in ambient temperature, based on the contribution plot (Fig. 4.9c), the 
regenerator pressure (P6) has the highest variation among all monitored variables in the process. 
We take this variable as evidence [Pevidence node7 (state 0)=100%] for BN updating and for further 
analysis in BN to find out the propagation path and the true root cause of the fault. The updating 
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of the network was done using GeNIe software. The updated network for the faulty condition is 
shown in Fig. 4.10a. The state 0 shows the faulty state for each variable and state 1 shows the 
normal state. Based on this figure ambient air temperature has a probability of 88% to be in faulty 
state [PTair(state=0)=88%],  pointing this node as the most potential root cause of the fault and 
this variation propagated in this system through regenerator temperature and will be reflected in 
regenerator pressure. The propagation path is given in Fig. 4.10b.  
 
(a) 
Tair Treg P6
 
(b) 
Figure 4.10. (a) BN for FCC process and (b) fault propagation pathway in FCC process for fault 
in ambient air temperature 
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Ramp disturbance on feed temperature: The second faulty scenario begins with normal 
operation for 1000 seconds and then is followed by a 10°C ramp in fresh feed temperature for the 
remaining 4000 seconds. The KPCA model construction is same as the first abnormal event. Fig. 
4.9b shows the departure of T2 values beyond the threshold that shows the successful detection of 
fault. After testing all sensors and being confident about their function, the root cause of the fault 
should be diagnosed among the internal states of the process. In the corresponding contribution 
plot (Fig. 4.9d) the furnace temperature has the highest contribution that means after the fault 
initiated this variable has the highest value of variation due to abnormality in the process. Based 
on this methodology this variable will be used as evidence node in the BN [Pevidence node8 (state 0)= 
100%]. Based on Fig. 4.11a, the updated network shows that the fresh feed temperature is the root 
cause of the abnormality in the process [PT1(state=0)=62%]. The propagation path is not lengthy 
and contains just two nodes (Fig. 4.11b).  
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(a) 
T1 T3
 
(b) 
Figure 4.11. (a) BN for FCC process and (b) fault propagation pathway in FCC process for fault 
in fresh feed temperature 
4.3.2. Tennessee Eastman Chemical Process 
In order to further illustrate the applicability of proposed method, the methodology is applied to 
benchmark Tennessee Eastman chemical process. The process consists of five major units: a 
reactor, condenser, compressor, separator, and stripper; and, it contains eight streams: A, B, C, D, 
E, F, G, and H. The flow diagram of this process is shown in Fig. 4.12. It consists of 41 measured 
variables and 12 manipulated variables. Among measured variables, 22 variables are continuous 
process variables and 19 variables are related to composition measurements.  The 22 continuous 
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process variables are shown in Table 4.5 that are the main focus of this research. There are 20 
potential faults in this process, among them we concentrate our study on those that are mentioned 
in Table 4.6 [3]. 
 
Figure 4.12. Schematic diagram of Tennessee Eastman process 
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Table 4.5. Measured variables in Tennessee Eastman 
Variable Description 
XMEAS(1) A Feed (stream 1) 
XMEAS(2) D Feed (Stream2) 
XMEAS(3) E Feed (Stream 3) 
XMEAS(4) Total Feed (Stream 4) 
XMEAS(5) Recycle Flow (Stream 8) 
XMEAS(6) Reactor Feed Rate (Stream6) 
XMEAS(7) Reactor Pressure 
XMEAS(8) Reactor Level 
XMEAS(9) Reactor Temperature 
XMEAS(10) Purge Rate (Stream 9) 
XMEAS(11) Separator temperature 
XMEAS(12) Separator level 
XMEAS(13) Separator pressure 
XMEAS(14) Separator Underflow (Stream 10) 
XMEAS(15) Stripper Level 
XMEAS(16) Stripper Pressure 
XMEAS(17) Stripper Underflow (Stream 11) 
XMEAS(18) Stripper Temperature 
XMEAS(19) Stripper Steam Flow 
XMEAS(20) Compressor Work 
XMEAS(21) Reactor Cooling Water Outlet temperature 
XMEAS(22) Separator Cooling Water Outlet Temperature 
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Table 4.6. Fault scenarios in Tennessee Eastman Chemical Process 
Fault no. Fault description 
IDV(6) Sudden loss of flow in feed A 
IDV(12) Random variation in condenser cooling water inlet temperature 
 
Fault scenarios: 
Sudden loss of feed A: The first faulty scenario is a loss in feed A at 500 second. This variation 
will affect the concentration of all components in the reactor. Consequently, this may change the 
process parameters in reactor and downstream units.  A training set consisting of 500 samples from 
the normal data was used to develop the KPCA model.  Gaussian kernel function was selected for 
linearization of data in KPCA. Four principal components were selected that captures 85% 
variation of the internal state of the process. The Hotelling’s T2 statistic was equal to 21.5 at 95% 
of confidence level. Fig. 4.13a shows that KPCA is able to detect this fault due to exceeding of T2 
values beyond the threshold. After a delay of 20 seconds, there is a sharp jump in Hotelling’s T2 
values for this fault and these values exceed the threshold instantaneously when the abnormality 
initiated indicating that KPCA is able to detect the A feed loss quickly. Next we confirmed using 
the sensor check module that all sensors are functioning well and moved on to detect the 
propagation pathway of fault in internal states using BN. 
The network construction and parameter estimation for Tennessee Eastman process was similar to 
FCC process using Granger causality and transfer entropy and was verified by process knowledge. 
Unlike FCC process, Tennessee Eastman contains a loop that makes the updating of the network 
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difficult. In order to deal with this issue, we designed a duplicate dummy point (pseudo point) for 
one of the variables involved in the loop. The constructed network in Fig. 4.14a shows that recycle 
flow, XMEAS(5), is involved in a loop in the network and was duplicated. One of these nodes is 
functioning as a parent node and the parameter estimation for this node was conducted like a parent 
node. The other node is like a child node and conditional probability values were considered for 
this node. Based on process knowledge it is obvious that variation in the feed A will affect the 
reactor feed rate because the inlet to the reactor in summation of A, D and E feeds. Since these 
feeds are gaseous, any variation in feed rate will affect the pressure in the reactor. Also it will 
affect the conversion due to change in residence time in the reactor which affects the temperature 
of the reactor due to the exothermic nature of the reaction. The contribution plot of each variable 
for the fault scenario is given in Fig. 4.13c. XMEAS(1), XMEAS(7), XMEAS(9) and XMEAS(21) 
have a high contribution in this faulty event; however, XMEAS(21) which is the reactor cooling 
water outlet temperature has the highest contribution and will be used as evidence in Bayesian 
network-based fault diagnosing module [PXMEAS(21) ( state 0)= 100%]. The result of updated 
network is shown in Fig. 4.14a. As can be seen in this figure, a variation in the Feed A propagates 
though the network, affecting all nodes in propagation pathway, and eventually show up on 
XMEAS(21), as the last node in the propagation pathway. The probability of Feed A to be in faulty 
state is 78%. In this abnormal scenario, between the true root cause, XMEAS(1),  and the faulty 
monitored variable, XMEAS(21), there are three intermediate variables (Fig. 4.14b).  
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Fig 4.13 (a) Hotelling’s T2 for the fault IDV(6) in Tennessee Eastman process 
 
Fig 4.13 (b) Hotelling’s T2 for the fault IDV(12) in Tennessee Eastman process 
 
Fig 4.13 (c) Contribution plot for the fault IDV(6) in Tennessee Eastman process 
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Fig 4.13 (d) Contribution plot for the fault IDV(12) in Tennessee Eastman process 
 
(a) 
XMEAS(1) XMEAS(6) XMEAS(7) XMEAS(9) XMEAS(21)
 
(b) 
Figure 4.14. (a) BN for Tennessee Eastman and (b) fault propagation pathway for the fault 
IDV(6) 
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Fault in condenser cooling water inlet temperature: The fault initiated with a random variation 
in condenser cooling water inlet temperature at 500 seconds. This variable is not among measured 
variables. The source variables connected to this fault are in literatures [89]. Since the training data 
for both faulty scenarios in Tennessee Eastman are the same, the KPCA model for the second 
faulty scenario is the same as the first one. Fig. 4.13b shows the departure of T2 values beyond the 
threshold (threshold=21.5). The random variation fault in the process variable was detected with 
a delay because the condenser cooling water inlet temperature is further downstream in the process 
and has less impact on the system compared to inlet feed. 
In this abnormal event, XMEAS(9), XMEAS(11), XMEAS(14) and XMEAS(21) have the most 
contribution to occurrence of the fault(Fig. 4.13d); however, XMEAS(14), which is separator 
underflow, has the highest contribution and this node was considered as evidence node in the BN 
[PXMEAS(14) (state 0)= 100%]. The updated network shows that separator temperature, 
XMEAS(11), is the root cause of this abnormality, having a value of 0.78 as the probability for 
faulty state (Fig. 4.15a). In this abnormal event, a variation on the condenser cooling water inlet 
temperature will deviate away the temperature of the downstream unit (separator temperature or 
XMEAS(11)). Since there is no measurement in condenser cooling water inlet temperature, this 
method is able to find the variable that is mostly affected by the main root (XMEAS(11)) and is 
able to propagate the fault to other variables.  As can be seen in Fig. 4.15b, this deviation will 
propagate through the network and will influence separator pressure, XMEAS(13), separator level, 
XMEAS(12), and eventually will effect separator underflow, XMEAS(14).  
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(a) 
XMEAS(11) XMEAS(13) XMEAS(12) XMEAS(14)
 
(b) 
Figure 4.15. (a) BN for Tennessee Eastman and (b) fault propagation pathway for the fault 
IDV(12) 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
This paper integrates diagnostic information from different diagnostic tools (KPCA, sensor 
validation module) and combine them with process knowledge using BN and generates a 
comprehensive methodology for process FDD. We focused on the different challenges that have 
received less research focus such as network construction, conditional probability estimation, and 
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loop handling. Sensor faults were separated from process fault using a sensor check module. BN 
was used to diagnose internal state faults and disturbance faults. The proposed methodology was 
applied to test different abnormal condition of FCC and Tennessee Eastman Chemical process. In 
both case studies, the proposed methodology demonstrated a very powerful diagnostic capability. 
The strength of the proposed method is it diagnoses root cause of fault as well as shows the 
propagation pathway of the fault. This information will help operators to take corrective action 
and recover the process quickly. However, there is still more need for research in this area. For 
example, most of processes are working in dynamic condition and process variables change with 
time. In such problems conditional probability of a variable at time t+1 depends on its status at 
time t and dynamic BN should be implemented for such a problem to handle the dynamic relation 
of the variables.  
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Appendix -Kernel PCA calculations [87, 88]: 
Given a sample containing n variables and m measurements, consider the nonlinear training set 
𝑿 = [𝑥1𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑚] 
𝑇. An important property of the feature space is that the dot product of two 
vectors ∅𝑖  and ∅𝑗 can be calculated as a function of the corresponding vectors xi and xj, that is, 
∅𝑖
𝑇∅𝑗 = 𝑘(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)      (1) 
Assume that the vectors in the feature space are scaled to zero mean and form the training data as 
𝜒 = [∅1 ∅2 … ∅𝑚]
𝑇. Let the sample covariance matrix of the data set in the feature space be S. 
We have, 
(𝑚 − 1)𝑆 =  𝜒𝑇𝜒 = ∑ ∅𝑖∅𝑖
𝑇𝑚
𝑖=1     (2) 
Thus, KPCA in the feature space is equivalent to solving the following eigenvector equation, 
𝜒𝑇𝜒𝜈 = ∑ ∅𝑖∅𝑖
𝑇𝜈 = 𝜆𝜈𝑚𝑖=1      (3) 
Kernel trick premultiplies Eq.3 by χ: 
𝜒𝜒𝑇𝜒𝜈 = 𝜆𝜒𝜈       (4) 
Defining 
𝑲 = 𝜒𝜒𝑇 = [
∅1
𝑇∅1 … ∅1
𝑇∅𝑚
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∅𝑚
𝑇 ∅1 … ∅𝑚
𝑇 ∅𝑚
] = [
𝑘(𝑥1, 𝑥1) … 𝑘(𝑥1, 𝑥𝑚)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑘(𝑥𝑚, 𝑥1) … 𝑘(𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑚)
]  (5) 
and denoting 
𝜶 = 𝜒𝜈       (6) 
we have  
𝑲𝜶 = 𝜆𝜶       (7) 
 
Equation 7 shows that α and λ are an eigenvector and eigenvalue of K, respectively. In order to 
solve ν from Eq.6, we premultiply it by χT and use Eq.3, 
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𝜒𝑇𝜶 = 𝜒𝑇𝜒𝜈 = 𝜆𝜈      (8) 
which shows that ν is given by 
𝜈 = 𝜆−1𝜒𝑇𝜶       (9) 
Therefore, to calculate the PCA model, we first perform eigen-decomposition of Eq.7 to obtain λi 
and αi. Then we use Eq.8 to find νi. 
Considering l principal components, the scores are calculated as: 
𝒕 = 𝚲−
1
2⁄ 𝑷𝑇𝒌(𝑥)      (10) 
where 𝑷 = [𝛼1
𝜊 … 𝛼𝑙
𝜊] and 𝚲 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝜆1 … 𝜆𝑙} are the l principal eigenvector and 
eigenvalues of K and 𝛼𝑖 = √𝜆𝑖𝛼𝑖
𝜊  and k(x) is:  
𝒌(𝑥) = 𝜒𝜙 = [𝜙1 𝜙2 … 𝜙𝑚]
𝑇𝜙 = [𝜙1
𝑇𝜙 𝜙2
𝑇𝜙 … 𝜙𝑚
𝑇𝜙] =
[𝑘(𝑥1, 𝑥) 𝑘(𝑥2, 𝑥) … 𝑘(𝑥𝑚, 𝑥)]
𝑇      (11) 
The T2 is calculated using kernel function as  
𝑇2 = 𝒌(𝑥)𝑇𝑷𝚲−𝟐𝑷𝑇𝒌(𝑥) = 𝒌(𝑥)𝑇𝑫𝒌(𝑥)   (12) 
where 𝑫 = 𝑷𝚲−𝟐𝑷𝑇       (13) 
Scaling: 
The calculation of covariance matrix holds if the mapping function in the feature space has zero 
mean. If this not the case, the vectors in the feature space have to be scaled to zero mean using the 
sample mean of the training data. The scaling of the kernel vector k(x) is  
?̅?(𝑥) = [?̅?1 ?̅?2 … ?̅?𝑚]
𝑇?̅? = 𝑭[𝒌(𝑥) − 𝑲𝟏𝑚]  (14) 
Where F=I-E, I is the identity matrix, E is an 𝑚 × 𝑚 matrix with elements 1/m and 1m is a m 
dimensional vector whose elements are 1/m. 
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Reconstruction-based contribution of variable: 
The procedure to estimate fault free data by applying a correction in the faulty data is referred to 
as reconstruction. Reconstruction of the fault free data from faulty measurements can be done by 
estimating the fault magnitude along the fault direction. The task of fault reconstruction is to 
estimate the normal values zi, by eliminating the effect of a fault fi from faulty data xi, 
𝑧𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝜉𝑖𝑓𝑖       (15) 
where 𝜉i is the fault direction. The objective of reconstructed based contribution is to ﬁnd the 
magnitude fi of a vector with direction such 𝜉i that the fault detection Index of the reconstructed 
measurement is minimized; that is, we want to ﬁnd fi such that 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥( 𝑥 − 𝜉𝑖𝑓𝑖)    (16) 
The same concept can be applied to KPCA and ﬁnd fi such that 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝒌( 𝑥 − 𝜉𝑖𝑓𝑖))    (17) 
The T2 Index is as follows: 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ?̅?(𝑧𝑖)
𝑇𝐷?̅?(𝑧𝑖)     (18) 
?̅?(𝑧𝑖) is scaled kernel vector.  The derivative of the Index with respect to fi is  
𝜕(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
𝜕(𝑓𝑖)
= 2?̅?𝑇(𝑧𝑖)𝐷
𝜕?̅?(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑓𝑖
     (19) 
The scaled kernel vector is ?̅?(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑭[𝒌(𝑧𝑖) − 𝑲 𝟏𝒎].Then, we have that 
𝜕?̅?(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑓𝑖
= 𝑭
𝜕𝒌(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕
      (20) 
So the derivative of Index will be 
𝜕(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
𝜕(𝑓𝑖)
= 2 𝐹 𝐷?̅?𝑇(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝒌(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑓𝑖
      (21) 
To calculate the derivative of k(zi) with respect to fi, we now that 
99 
 
𝜕𝒌(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑓𝑖
=
𝜕𝒌(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝑓𝑖
      (22) 
Since 𝒌(𝑧𝑖) = [𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥1), 𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥2)…  𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑚)] and 𝑘(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = exp (−(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
𝑇
(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗) 𝑐⁄ ), 
we have 
𝜕
𝜕𝑧𝑖
 𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = −2𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
(𝑧𝑖−𝑥𝑗)
𝑇
𝑐
   (23) 
and 
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= −𝝃𝑖      (24) 
Therefore, the vector with the derivative of k(zi) respect to fi  
𝜕𝒌(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑓𝑖
=
2
𝑐
[
 
 
 
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥1)(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑥1)
𝑇
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥1)(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑥2)
𝑇
⋮
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑚)(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑥𝑚)
𝑇]
 
 
 
𝝃𝑖 =
2
𝑐
[
 
 
 
 𝑘
(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑥1)(𝑥 − 𝑥1)
𝑇 − 𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥1)𝑓𝑖𝝃𝑖
𝑇
𝑘(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑥1)(𝑥 − 𝑥2)
𝑇 − 𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥2)𝑓𝑖𝝃𝑖
𝑇
⋮
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑚)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚)
𝑇 − 𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑚)𝑓𝑖𝝃𝑖
𝑇]
 
 
 
 
=
2
𝑐
[𝑩𝝃𝑖 −
𝒌(𝑧𝑖)𝑓𝑖]      (25) 
Where B is calculated as 
𝑩 =
[
 
 
 
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥1)(𝑥 − 𝑥1)
𝑇
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥1)(𝑥 − 𝑥2)
𝑇
⋮
𝑘(𝑧𝑖, 𝑥𝑚)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚)
𝑇]
 
 
 
    (26) 
We can now calculate the derivative of Index as 
𝜕(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
𝜕𝑓𝑖
=
4
𝑐
𝐹𝐷?̅?𝑇(𝑧𝑖)[𝑩𝝃𝑖 − 𝒌(𝑧𝑖)𝑓𝑖]  (27) 
After setting the derivative equal to zero and solving for fi we obtain 
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𝑓𝑖 =
𝝃𝑖
𝑇𝑩𝑇 𝐹𝐷?̅?(𝑧𝑖)
?̅?𝑇(𝑧𝑖) 𝐹𝐷?̅?(𝑧𝑖) 
     (28) 
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Chapter 5 
Summary conclusion and future work 
In this thesis, the problem of collecting different fault diagnostic information and integrating them 
in a complete framework for early detection of a process abnormality and diagnosing the root cause 
of the failure is investigated. This thesis proposed two frameworks based on causality analysis and 
BN as strong tools for diagnosing root cause of fault.   Also there are some ambiguity in the 
application of Bayesian network for example, validating the causal relationships between 
variables, estimation of parameters of network, dealing with cyclic network, and distinguishing 
between instrumental failure and process failure which are addressed in this thesis.  
5.1. Conclusions 
 While applying different diagnostic tools, the outputs of some diagnostic tools contain 
useful information for other tools. In other words integrating some diagnostic methods and 
using their information in a hybrid framework will increase the accuracy of fault diagnosis 
task. 
 The sensitivity of KPCA to process variation is a promising point in the detection of an 
abnormality in the process. Although sometimes its detection is delayed depending of the 
magnitude of the abnormality, but even after a considerable lag it can detect the occurrence 
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of the abnormality quite early. Additionally the delay can be adjusted with the KPCA 
parameters such as confidence level and number of PCs.  
 KPCA method is not a strong tool in diagnosis and in the contribution plots it delivers some 
of the variables which has a substantial variations after the abnormality initiated. The root 
cause is often between the isolated variables indicating that the variation of the root cause 
of the abnormality leads to variation in the other nodes which are located in the propagation 
pathway. 
 Granger causality and transfer entropy can determine the causal relation between variables 
and are useful tools for network construction, but in case of having few variables they can 
be used to recognize the root cause in qualitative manner. 
 Although TE and Granger causality have different definitions but for variables with normal 
distributions they provide the same results.  
 Process variation is mitigated in residuals which are obtained from process data, however 
they keep the information of the data; resulting in more precise network parameter 
estimation. 
5.2. Suggestions for future work 
 Chemical processes operate in dynamic mode; resulting in time series data, and the status 
of a variable is determined based on its past status and the effect of other variables. In such 
a problems, using Dynamic Bayesian Network will contribute to more precise diagnostic. 
 Process recovery is the next step of fault detection and diagnosis methodology in which an 
action should be taken in order to mitigate the effect of the fault in whole process and keep 
the process in safe mode. This research did not work in this area; however it is worthwhile 
to integrate fault diagnostic method with process recovery. 
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 In sensor fault detection module, we kept the methodology simple by using rule based 
sensor fault detection module; however, bank of Kalman filters which is more precise 
method will result in a better sensor fault detection module and can be integrated with this 
methodology. 
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